Human Differences in the Ability to Differentiate Spoken Lies from Spoken Truths by Lavrakas, Paul John
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
1976
Human Differences in the Ability to Differentiate
Spoken Lies from Spoken Truths
Paul John Lavrakas
Loyola University Chicago
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1976 Paul John Lavrakas
Recommended Citation
Lavrakas, Paul John, "Human Differences in the Ability to Differentiate Spoken Lies from Spoken Truths" (1976). Dissertations. Paper
1689.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/1689
HUMAN DIFFERENCES IN THE ABILITY 
TO DIFFERENTIATE SPOKEN LIES 
FROM SPOKEN TRUTHS 
by 
Paul J. Lavrakas 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
. 
December 
1976 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
• , 
I thank my wife,Barbara J. Lavrakas, for the interpersonal support 
she has'given to make my graduate work possible. I also thank my 
parents, John and Catherine Lavrakas,for the emotional support they have 
always provided me. 
I thank Dr. R.A. Maier, Dr. E.J. Posavac, and Dr. Leonard Bickman 
• for the opportunities they have provided for my growth as a research 
psychologist. 
Finally, I thank the members of my dissertation committee, 
Dr. R.A. Maier (Chairman), Dr. E.J. Posavac, and Dr. T. Petzel. 
ii 
VITA 
The author, Paul John Lavrakas, is the son of John Lavrakas and 
Catherine (Gomatos) Lavrakas. He was born October 7, 1946 in Cambridge, 
. 
, 
Massachusettes. 
His elementary and secondary education was obtained in the public 
schools of Birmingham, Michigan. He graduated from Birmingham High 
School_in June, 1964. 
In September, 1964, he entered Michigan State University and in 
June, 1968, received the degree of Bachelor of Arts with a major in 
social sciences. 
In September, 1968, he began teaching in the Chicago Public 
Schools, where he remained employed until his resignation in September, 
1972. 
In September, 1972, he was granted a research assistantship in 
• 
experimental psychology at Loyola University of Chicago. In February, 
1975, he was awarded a Master of Arts degree in Psychology. 
In June, 1976, he became Executive Director of Social Systems 
Research Institute, Evanston, Illinois. 
His published works include: "Female preferences for male 
physiques" (1975); "Citizen crime reporting projects: a summary report" 
(1976); "Lying behavior and the evaluation of lies" (1976); and "A 
perspective on the recognition of other-race faces" (1976). 
iii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
VITA 
LIST OF TABLES 
LIST OF FIGURES 
INTRODUCTION 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
. . . 
• , 
Past Investigations of Human Lie Detection 
Purpose of Present Study . . • . . • • • . . 
Hypothesized Correlates of Judgmental Accuracy 
Interpersonal Trust and Judgmental Accuracy 
Sununary 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Making of Honest and Dishonest Audio-tape 
General Procedure 
Dependent Variables 
Subject Variables 
RESULTS 
Subject Reliability . . . . 
. . 
. 
Ratings of Honest/Dishonest Tape ~timuli 
Stimuli 
Correlation Analyses . . . . • . • . . 
Regression Analyses for Judgmental Accuracy 
Discriminant Analysis for Accuracy Scores 
DISCUSSION 
Judgmental Accuracy . • • • • • • • • • 
Judgments in Human Lie Detection and 
Cronbach's Measurement Components •••. 
Validity Issues . • . . . . • . . • . • • . 
Possible Future Directions for Research in 
Perceiver-Differences in Hu~an Lie Detection 
Possible Applied Implications of Research in 
Perceiver-Differences in Human Lie Detection 
REFERENCE NOTES 
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Page 
ii 
iii 
vi-
vii 
1 
3 
17 
21 
27 
31 
33 
33 
33 
38 
40 
42 
48 
48 
48 
58 
62 
69 
74 
74 
80 
84 
93 
94 
95 
96 
Page 
APPENDIX A 102 
APPENDIX B 104 
APPENDIX C 106 
APPENDIX D 109 
• , 
APPENDIX E 111 
APPENDIX F 113 
APPENDIX G 115 
APPENDIX H 118 
APPENDIX I 120 
r 
v 
Table 
1. 
2. 
LIST OF TABLES 
Means and Standard Deviations of 
Subject Variables .•••••• 
Expected Versus Observed Frequencies 
of Accuracy Scores . . • . • • 
3. Percentage of Accurate Judgments for 
Page 
49 
52 
the 20 Stimuli • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 54 
4. Frequency Distributions of Scaled 
Judgments • • . • 
5. Intercorrelation Matrix 
6. Group One and Group Two Means for Subject 
Variables in Discriminant Analysis 
7. Efficiency of Discriminant Function 
I' 
vi 
57 
59-61 
71 
72 
Figure 
1. 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Twenty Conditions for Generating 
Stimulus Lies and Truths • . • • 
. 
2. Rating Scale Used by Listeners to 
Page 
37 
Ju?ge Stimuli • . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 41 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Expected and Observed Frequency 
Distributions of Accuracy Scores 
Scatterplot of Actual Accuracy 
vs. Predicted Accuracy 
Two-Stage Judgment Model in 
Human Lie Detection 
vii 
51 
67 
82 
.. 
INTRODUCTION 
The ancient commandment, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against 
thy neighbor", attests to the existence of lying (defined here as the 
conscious effort of a speaker to mislead a listener by making a false 
statement), and an awareness of the problems it causes, since earliest 
times. A recent report by the United States House of Representatives' 
Committee on Government Operations (House Report #94-795, 1976) reviewed 
some of the ways in which past societies have attempted to detect lies 
and verify truths: 
At various times, and in different places, there evolved such tests 
as the ordeal of boiling water, the ordeal of the red-hot iron and 
the ordeal of the red-hot stove. In one such ordeal, the suspected 
wrong doer was expected to thrust his hand into a fire. If the hand 
was unsinged when removed the individual was declared innocent; if 
the hand was burned, that was positive proof of guilt. In other 
circumstances, truth or lack of truth was determined by the pattern 
assumed by a handful of tossed pebbles. A test used by the early 
Chinese required suspects to chew rice powder while being questioned. 
If the rice powder was dry when spit out, the man was condemned, 
on the premise that intention of guilt supposedly dried up his 
salivary glands. (p. 4) 
As opposed to these various trials by ordeal (some of which do reflect 
a "primitive" understanding of psychology and physiology), the earliest 
known linking of emotional arousal with lie detection was made by 
Erasistratus (300 B.C.) who suggested that an increase in heartbeat-
frequency was associated with deception. Despite this early observation, 
it appears that it was not until the late 1800's that a mechanized de-
vice was employed (by Cesare Lombroso, an Italian criminologist) in an 
attempt to detect deception (House Report #94-795, 1976; Wilhelm & 
Burns, 1954). 
1 
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During the 1900's this interest in the efficacy of a machine to de-
tect a physiological change, which was assumed to be associated with the 
act of lying, led to the development of sophisticated devices that moni-
tor breathing pattern, blood pressure and pulse, and/or skin resistance 
{GSR). In addition, since the early 1960's two new devices have been 
developed, the Psychological Stress Evaluator and the Voice Analyzer, 
which attempt to detect deception by monitoring changes in various para-
meters of the human voice. 
Despite these efforts to employ extremely sensitive technical devices 
for detecting deception, a United States Congressional Committee has con-
cluded that "there is no lie detector, neither machine nor human" (p. 46). 
Thus a committee asserts that there exists, at present, no lie detector 
with proven validity (House Report #94-795, 1976). 
Added to this controversy over the validity of mechanical lie 
detectors, Lykken (1975) has suggested that it may not be so much the 
machine which is or is not accurate as it is the human who operates the 
.machine. Focusing specifically on the human facet, Maier and Lavrakas 
(1~76) have recently observed that "the behavior of lying is something 
that most, if not all, humans have experienced both as a listener and 
as a liar •••. Since the lying of others can cause problems for people, 
it is important to develop a sensitivity to lying so as to function 
efficiently in everyday life" (p. 581). In addition, the findings of 
Anderson (1966) highlight the importance that attempted-deception plays 
in person's lives. His results indicated that of 555 standardized per-
sonality-trait adjectives the ten least liked personality traits included 
liar (555), phoney (554), dishonest (551), untruthful (550), and 
deceitful (546); while the ten most liked personality-traits include 
sincere (1), honest (2), loyal (4), truthful (5), and trustworthy (6). 
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Given these observations regarding the important role attempted-
deception plays in interpersonal relations it can be suggested that hu-
mans have strong reason to learn to distinguish the behavior of a person 
engaged in lying from a person speaking the truth. This activity of 
trying to differentiate lying from truthfulness will be referred to as 
human lie detection, and, in a broad context, can refer to all human 
verbal interactions i.e., all verbal exchanges involve at least an im-
plicit decision on the part of the listener of whether or not to be-
lieve the speaker. 
From a behavioral perspective, human lie detection can be de-
scribed as an interpersonal situation in which the speaker is the stimu-
lus that the listener perceives. In the past decade research began with-
in this stimulus-perceiver framework. This research has attempted to 
explore stimulus-properties, perceiver-properties and the interaction 
of stimulus and perceiver in human lie detection situations. 
Past Investigations of Human Lie Detection. 
In the late 1960's, N.R.F. Maier and his associates showed an in-
terest in the systematic investigation of human lie detection because 
of the possible relevancy their findings might have within the context 
of personnel interviews. t1aier (1966) devised a two-person role-play-
ing method to generate honest interactions and dishonest interactions 
in order to investigate the question, "if one member of a pair makes 
honest versus dishonest statements does he behave differently and, if 
so, can these differences be detected by the other member of a pair?" 
(p. 55). Maier's role-playing format involved one subject interacting 
in the role of a student with another subject playing the role of a 
professor. The content of'the interaction dealt with the possibility 
that there had been a grading error on an exam, versus the possibility 
that the student had altered the exam after it had been graded. The 
role instructions for the professor were irtvariate; they explained that 
the student was concerned about the low grade he had received and felt 
that part of his answer had not been graded, as i' had been written 
on the reverse side of a blue book page. It was explained in the pro-
fessor's instruction that this answer could have been added after the 
blue book had been returned. It was also explained that the professor's 
assistant, who had graded the exam, felt certain that the answer on 
the reverse side had not been there originally. 
The role instructions for the student-subject varied depending 
upon the condition to which he/she was assigned. The honest role-
playing instructions informed the student-subject that the low grade on 
the exam appeared to be the result of the grader possibly not seeing a 
part that had been written on the reverse of a blue book page. As 
this part had been well written the honest student was told that he/she 
should reasonably have expected a better grade. The dishonest role-
playing instructions informed the student-subject that the low grade on 
the exam would hurt his/her gradepoint and that, by adding a well writ-
ten part to a reverse side of a blue book page, the professor could 
possibly be convinced that his assistant had missed this answer and 
therefore be willing to raise the grade on the exam. 
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Eighty-eight professor-student pairs interacted with the professor-
subject unaware of the condition that his student-subject had been as-
signed. Following the interaction the professor-subject rated the stu-
dent-subject on a five-point trust-distrust scale (with an "uncertain" 
middlepoint). Of the 70 professor-subjects who made a trust or distrust 
decision (18 indicated that they were uncertain) 64.3% correctly judged 
the honesty or dishonesty of their student role-player. Maier presented 
the following discussion: 
A clear finding in the experiment is that while the interviewers 
distinguish between honest and dishonest interviewees better than 
chance ••• preliminary explorations of cues used to judge the honesty 
of the interviewee found that the same cues led to opposite conclu-
sions. Therefore the only conclusion justified from our present 
knowledge is that the interviewers get an impression and, on the 
basis of this, make better than chance judgments (p. 65). 
In a follow-up study Maier and Jansen (1967) chose to investigate 
the "reliability of reasons used in making judgments of honesty and dis-
honesty" i.e., were there specific behaviors in the speaker (stimulus 
properties) that were systematically related to the decisions reached by 
the observer (perceiver)? The same student-professor role-playing for-
mat was used to generate four role-playing interactions which were ob-
served by 57 subjects. These subject-observers made individual ratings 
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regarding the honesty or dishonesty of the four student role players. In 
addition they indicated what behaviors of the student role players in-
fluenced their ratings. As found by Maier (1966), subjects as a group 
were significantly better-than-chance in accurately judging the honesty 
or dishonesty of the student role-players. Comparison of the accuracy of 
individual judges also showed that the judges differed in their judgmen-
tal accuracy i.e., accuracy ranged from no correct ratings to all correct 
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ratings. Despite the individual differences in judgmental accuracy the 
reasons given by subjects for making their judgments did not reliably 
relate to accuracy or inaccuracy. The only trend that was present was 
that accurate judges gave ·a "few" more reasons for their judgments than 
did inaccurate judges. Maier and Jansen concluded: 
Do judges know the reason behind their judgments of honesty or dis-
honesty? Our answer must be a qualified 'no'. While very good and 
very poor judges used the same kinds of reason .•. the number of rea-
sons presented relates more to certainty of judgment than to ac-
curacy .••• The sum total of the evidence indicates people make judg-
ments with varying degrees of accuracy, but these judgments seem to 
be based upon impressions rather,than logic /?· 150). 
This study did not find properties inherent to the perceiver (as opera-
tionalized by the type of reasons given for the ratings) which were re-
liably related to accuracy in human lie detection. 
Possibly because of the null finding of Maier and Jansen, Maier 
in his follow-up study (Maier & Thurber, 1968), changed directions and 
pursued an investigation of stimulus properties as they may relate to 
accuracy in human lie detection. Using the same student-professor role-
playing format, Maier and Thurber varied the medium by which subjects re-
ceived information about the honest and dishonest interactions: a) a 
Watchers group both watched and heard the interaction; b) a Listeners 
group heard tape recordings of the interaction; and c) a Readers group 
read transcripts of the interaction. The logic of this exploratory 
study was to "isolate visual, auditory, and verbal cues by comparing 
the accuracy of judgments under the three conditions, ... as the speaker's 
personality, facial expressions, verbal intonation and mannerisms all 
may give cues which serve as either aids or distractors" (p. 24). 
A total of 57 Watchers, 98 Listeners and 64 Readers judged two 
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honest and two dishonest interactions on a six-point trust-distrust 
scale. The results indicated that while all groups were significantly 
better-than-chance, the Listeners (average accuracy of 77%) and Readers 
(average accuracy of 77.3%) were significantly more accurate than Watch-
ers (average accuracy of 58.3%). These results were interpreted as in-
dicating that visual cues may serve as "distractors" and, as such, ac-
count for the inferior performance of the group that both saw and heard 
the honest/dishonest interactions. In drawing this conclusion Maier and 
Thurber were not explicit about whet~er the visu"~l information "dis-
tracted" the tvatchers by providing them more information to attend to, 
or "distracted" them because visual information is harder to judge than 
spoken information. 
Despite this uncertainty about why the Watchers were less accurate, 
the authors drew attention to an interesting parallel between their 
findings and the "real world". Maier and Jansen stated: 
Juries are composed of untrained observers who often must make 
judgments about the integrity of a witness. The witness is always 
present and, as these results suggest, may serve as a distractor. 
It is also interesting to note that the symbol of justice stands 
with ••• a blindfold over her eyes-she can only hear! (p. 30) 
Independent of the research N.R.F. Maier and his coworkers were 
engaged in 1 , P. Ekman and W.V. Friesen began research related to their 
hypothesis that there are body movements and facial expressions which a 
deceiver is not able to control and, therefore, emerge as leakage or 
deception cues. Specifically relevant to the Maier and Thurber 
"distraction-of-visual-information hypotheses" was Ekman and Friesen's 
1Personal communication from P. Ekman, July, 1976. 
8 
(1969) theoretical suggestion that: the face is equipped to lie the most 
••• and thus can be a very confusing source of information in deception" 
(p. 99). "The body, however, usually more truthfully reveals to the 
observer how the person actually feels (leakage) or the fact that some-
thing is amiss (deception cues)" (Ekman & Friesen, 1974, p. 289). As 
Maier and Thurber's Watchers were untrained observers they may well have 
focused on the face for information and, thereby, were distracted. 
To experimentally pursue their hypothesis that the body was a great-
er source of deception cues than the face, Ekman and Friesen (1974) made 
a set of video-tapes which contained excerpts from both honest and dis-
honest interactions. These video-taped interactions, unlike the role-
playing procedure used by Maier and his associates, conformed with 
Ekman and Friesen's (1969) four criterion dimensions of deception inter-
action. These criterion dimensions are: a) the saliency of the decep-
tion; b) the stakes for success; c) the balance of roles; and d) the 
extent of antagonism between deceived and deceived about the maintenance 
of deception. 
Ekman and Friesen (1974) operationalized these criteria within the 
context of student nurses being interviewed about a series of films they 
were watching. Specifically, a group of student nurses were invited by 
the Dean of the Nursing school to individually participate in an experi-
ment. At the time of the experiment it was explained to a student nurse 
that she would be asked to view two pleasant films and two stressful 
films (medical training films depicting amputation, and the treatment of 
severe burns). It was also explained to her that "a nurse must be able 
·to deceive in certain situations e.g., when talking with the family of 
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a severely injured child, she must conceal her own worries or distress 
and convey positive affect to reassure the parents" (p. 290). There-
fore the student nurse was led to believe that the deception she would 
be asked to engage in would be similar to deception that would be rele-
vant to her "success" as a nurse. 
While the student nurse was watching each film she was interviewed 
by an adult female who was unaware of the content of the specific seg-
ment being seen. Prior to the start of each segment the nurse was 
shown instructions informing her to be honest or deceptive in the 
subsequent interview. The interview itself dealt primarily with questions 
regarding the feelings the student nurse was experiencing while watching 
the film. While the interview film-session transpired video-tapes were 
made of the nurse's face and of her body by concealed cameras. 
Following the filming of these interviews "composite" video-tapes 
were made from samples of the filmed interviews of 16 different student 
nurses for use in two subsequent judgmental tasks. Judgmental Task A 
required observers to rate one sample of non-verbal behavior from each 
nurses nonverbal repertoire (p. 291). Judgmental Task B required ob-
servers to first view an example of a nurse's nonverbal behavior which 
was identified as honest (i.e., a familiarity example) and then rate an 
unidentified example of the same nurse. 
Observers were assigned to experimental conditions in a 2 x 2 x 2 
repeated-measurement ANOVA in which the variables were area (face or 
body), task (A or B), and condition (whether the behavior judged was 
actually honest or deceptive). The results indicated that only when 
observers had seen an example of the nurse's honest nonverbal behavior 
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were more accurate judgments made from the body versus the face. This 
was interpreted by the authors as partial support of their hypothesis. 
In addition to these results Ekman and Friesen had four experienced 
facial-analysts view the video-tapes of the nurse's faces with the 
familiarity example. "Each of these observers accurately judged both 
the honest and deceptive behavior of almost all the nurses, suggesting 
that the information is there in the face, if the viewer knows what to 
look for and how to interpret it? (p. 295). 
Pursuing their interests in the stimulus properties that distinguish 
honest behavior from deceptive behavior, Ekman and Friesen (1976) inves-
tigated both visual and vocal behavior, using the set of video tapes 
from their previous study. These video tapes of the student nurses were 
analyzed for hand movement and voice pitch as follows: 
Three types of hand movements were distinguished: illustrators, 
movements which are tied to speech rhythm and illustrate what is 
said; shrugs, ••• in which the hands are rotated at the wrists to 
symbolically transmit the message of uncertainty or inability; and, 
adaptors, movements in which one hand makes contact with the other 
hand or other part of the body or the face. Pitch was measured by 
selecting two short speech samples from the [nurse's] answers and 
extracting fundamental frequency (pitch) of the voice by autocor-
relation procedures using an on-line speech analysis computer 
system (p. 2). 
Results of these analyses indicated that deceptive interactions contain 
significantly few illustrators, more shrugs, and an increase in voice 
pitch as compared with the honest interactions. 
Ekman and Friesen also had four groups of subjects rate these in-
teractions on 14 bi-polar scales e.g., truthworthy/untrustworthy. One 
group saw only the body, the second group say only the face, the third 
only heard the interactions after they had been electronically filtered 
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to remove those frequencies above 400 Hz, and a fourth group only heard 
unaltered versions of the interactions. While the authors did not re-
port results related to the accuracy of the various groups, they did find 
that there was no difference in the scale ratings of the group exposed to 
the filtered audio compared to the ratings of the group who were exposed 
to the unaltered voices. On the other hand, the group exposed to the face-
videos made more positive ratings (e.g., more trustworthy) than did the 
group exposed to the body-videos. This last finding was interpreted as 
being in accordance with the previous findings of Ekman and Friesen (1974). 
Finally, the authors concluded, on the basis of the relationship between 
the voice pitch measurement and the observer ratings that the group which 
listened to the unaltered speech apparently were mislead or confused by 
the speakers' control of their voices during deception. 
Ekman and Friesen (1976) stated that forthcoming reports would de-
scribe the results of these findings in greater detail. In addition, they 
stated that they were presently working on research designed to replicate 
these findings on a new sample of "interactions" and, in general, to furth-
er investigate their interest in the stimulus properties in human lie 
detection. 
As the problems of "Watergate" were causing national concern over 
the credibility of high officials, R.A. Maier and P.J. Lavrakas (1976) 
noted the general dearth of systematic research that had been done on 
human lie detection. As such, they began a series of studies to follow 
some of the leads of the earlier investigations, and to probe further into 
the factors affecting detection of lying. 
Maier and Lavrakas chose to begin with a study designed to validate 
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the role-playing procedure used by N.R.F. Maier and his associates 
(Maier, 1965; Maier & Jansen, 1967; and Maier & Thurber, 1968). This 
approach was taken because of a methodological concern with the construct 
validity of the role-play:i,ng interactions i.e., did a person role-playing 
an honest or dishonest role validly portray the construct "truth" or "lie". 
In order to investigate this issue a lie detection apparatus (measuring 
GSR) was used to determine if individuals role-playing honest and dishon-
est roles could be physiologically differentiate. It was hypothesized 
that if the lie detector did differentiated, then people role-playing 
liars would presumably be similar to actual liars from a physiological-
emotional standpoint. 
In order to test this hypothesis Maier & Lavrakas had all subjects 
play both an honest and dishonest part, one as a student interacting 
with a professor (Experimenter One) and one as a motorist interacting 
with a policeman (also Experimenter One). Subjects were randomly as-
signed packets containing role-instructions so the experimenters did 
not know whether the subject was playing an honest or dishonest student 
or an honest or dishonest motorist. After Experimenter One and the sub-
role-player had finished an interaction, Experimenter One asked the 
subject role-player some yes-no questions following a standard meth-
od used by polygraphers (Wilhelm and Burns, 1954, pp. 49-67). While 
the subject responded to the questions, Experimenter Two monitored the 
lie detector. Each subject's GSR responses in the honest and the dis-
honest role were later compared. The results indicated that subjects as 
a group were not consistently differentiated by the lie detector be-
tween their honest and dishonest roles. Either the lie detector 
13 
procedure was insensitive or subjects failed to react physiologically 
in the role-playing situations the same way that 1 real 1 liars are as-
sumed to react. 
Using tape recording's of four role-playing interactions from this 
first study, Maier and Lavrakas next investigated whether listeners 
would correctly judge the role-players that the lie detector had cor-
rectly identified, and would fail to correctly identify the role-players 
which the lie detector missed. To this end, four taped role-playing in-
teractions from the first study were.chosen: tW 0 from a subject who had 
been correctly differentiated by the lie detector, and two from a sub-
ject who had not. A group of 56 listeners heard each tape recording 
and then rated it for honesty or dishonesty. It was found that subjects, 
as a group, correctly identified the two tapes of the role-player which 
the machine had been correct on. The group of listeners also correctly 
identified one of the two tapes of the role-player the machine had been 
wrong on. In addition, it was found that female listeners were marginal-
ly superior to males in their overall judgmental accuracy. The finding 
that subjects as a group were better-than-chance was consistent with 
those of N.R.F. Maier and his associates; but the null results of the 
first study placed doubt upon the construct validity of the role-playing 
technique. Thus it was uncertain whether it was lie/truth cues the lis-
teners were basing decisions on, or whether it was more "difficult" to 
role-play a dishonest role and listeners were cueing in on this difficul-
ty? 
A final study reported by Maier and Lavrakas compared the judgment 
of honesty or dishonesty made by individuals with judgments made by a 
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group composed of these same individuals. It was reasoned that accord-
ing to the diffusion-of-responsibility hypothesis (Bern, Wallach, and 
Kogan, 1965) a group would make more suspicious judgments than the aver-
age individual in that group i.e., an individual in a group bears less 
responsibility if another person is falsely accused of lying than does 
the same individual making his judgment alone. 
To test this hypothesis Maier and Lavrakas chose a tape-recorded 
role-playing interaction which had earlier been found to elicit an ap-
proximately equal number of honest and dishonest judgments. Subjects 
first listened to the tape recording, and then rated the tape individual-
ly before meeting as a group to arrive at a group rating. The results 
showed that for all groups, the group rating was more suspicious than 
the average individual rating of the subjects comprising that group. 
This finding was interpreted as particularly interesting since many de-
cisions concerning individuals are made by juries and committees which 
stress group concensus. As such, it appeared that while an individual 
qua individual may have been willing to give the speaker the benefit of 
the doubt in judging honesty, the same individual qua group member was 
willing to conform to the group consensus of a more suspicious judgment. 
Besides the research programs of N.R.F. Maier and associates, 
Ekman and Friesen, and Maier and Lavrakas there appears to be few other 
studies directly investigating human lie detection. In one such study, 
Baskett and Freidel! (1974) investigated the influence of linguistic 
and extra-linguistic variables on the attribution of lying. They found 
that if the target person responded either too quickly or too slowly the 
·subjects judged his response as a lie more often than if the response 
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delay was of an intermediate duration. Unfortunately no results were 
reported which related the accuracy of the listeners' judgments to the 
target person's linguistic behavior. 
In another study, Knapp and Hart (1974) required undergraduate 
Vietnam veterans to participate in both an honest and a dishonest inter-
view in which they argued for or against increasing veteran's education-
al benefits. Analysis of the video-taped interviews showed that the 
veterans fidgited (e.g., touching the face, moving the legs) and spoke 
more hesitatingly in the dishonest condition. Unfortunately these re-
sults appear somewhat equivocal as they have uncertain external and con-
struct validity, i.e., were the veterans equally qualified to argue a-
gainst the benefits, or were they merely arguing a position with which 
they had less personal familiarity? 
A final study to be reviewed is that of Hocking (Note 1). He 
investigated the detection of deceptive communication from verbal, 
visual, and para-linguistic cues, by operationalizing the lie/truth con-
struct in a manner similar to Ekman and Friesen (1974). In this in-
stance, subjects (all of whom planned careers in law enforcement) were 
invited to participate in an experiment by the director of their School 
of Criminal Justice. Similar to Ekman and Friesen, Hocking motivated 
his subjects by informing them that the ability to lie successfully was 
positively related to success as law enforcement officers. After a set 
of video-taped stimuli of honest/dishonest persons was made, 923 "human 
lie detectors" participated under one of 28 separate conditions. Some 
of the various conditions included seeing a close-up of the head only, 
or of the body only, or both the head and body; another condition dealt 
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with seeing the video-tapes in either color or black-and-white; and an-
other condition dealt with hearing the audio or not hearing the audio. 
The major results of his study were: 
(a) Judgments based on the body-only wer; more accurate than judg-
ments based on the head-only within the context of lies and 
truths of emotional content. This result did not hold when 
the lies/truths were factual in content. Hocking therefore 
suggested that the Ekman and Friesen (1974) finding of body-
leakage may be limited to emotional situations. 
(b) Within the head-only condition, judgmental accuracy was higher 
for the group that saw the tapes in color versus the group who 
viewed the tapes in black and white. While Hocking did not ex-
plicitly interpret this result, he did suggest that it was not 
due to the subjects being more motivated in the color format. 
(c) For the lies and truths that contained factual content, the 
audio-only group had a greater accuracy than the visual-only 
group. On the other hand, for the lies and truths that con-
tained emotional content there was no relationship between audio 
or visual information and accuracy. 
(d) Observers who both saw and heard the interactions were signifi-
cantly more confident in their judgment than those who only saw 
the interaction. In addition, those observers who saw head-
only were more confident than the observers who saw head-and-
body or body-only. 
The review of the literature indicates a relevant dearth of defini-
"tive research which directly investigates human lie detection. Most 
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studies have focused on delineating behaviors that differentiate between 
a person who is lying and a person who is telling the truth. This in-
terest has been referred to in this dissertation as the investigation 
of stimulus properties of-the interpersonal behavior of lying. In 
general there appears to be a consensus of findings that indicate "liars" 
do behave differently from "truthtellers", and that this difference is 
discriminable by other humans. While these findings are very much in ac-
cordance with the assumption underlying mechanized lie detection (i.e., 
a person who is lying will show some identifiable, behavioral reaction), 
there is some question as to the external validity and construct validi-
ty of the findings. Devising experiments that require subjects to "lie" 
or to tell the "truth" may not validly represent the veracity dimension 
as it exists in the real world. In addition, it is uncertain to what 
other settings and other types of "lies and truths" these findings are 
generalizeable. 
Purpose of the Present Study 
The review of past investigations of human lie detection indicates 
that subjects as a group, are able to judge veracity better-than-chance. 
While this may not be surprising from a commonsense standpoint, it is 
especially relevant given the present concern over the validity of me-
chanical lie detectors. If the use of mechanical lie detectors is dis-
continued as the Committee on Government Operations of the United States 
House of Representatives (House Report #74-795, 1976) has recommended 
"for all governmental agencies for all purposes" (p. 46), then decisions 
regarding veracity shall remain totally within the province of human de-
cision makers. With this in mind, it is of interest to know more about 
''"" 
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~erceiver differences in human lie detection. 
As has been mentioned, persons appear to differ in their ability 
to accurately judge veracity. Maier and Lavrakas (1976) also found that 
females were marginally better than males and suggested that this could 
be due to females traditional acculturation as "social-emotional special-
ists". Yet other than this finding of possible sex differences there 
appears to be very little known about personological differences as they 
may relate to accuracy in human lie detection. Thus the present work 
was primarily designed as an exploratory investigation of human differ-
ences in the ability to judge veracity. 
In the absence of past findings directly related to perceiver dif-
ferences in human lie detection, a review of past research on human judg-
mental accuracy in person perception, was undertaken. It was intended 
that this approach would identify a set of personological variables 
which would allow for the investigation of patterns of individual differ-
ences as they relate to judgmental accuracy in human lie detection. 
Immediately relevant to this aforementioned concern, Cline and 
Richards (1960) investigated whether or not accuracy in person perception 
was a general trait. They devised an on-the-street interview procedure 
in which an interviewee was questioned regarding his personal values and 
self-concept. Each interview was filmed, and, following its completion, 
the interviewee completed a series of personality inventories. In the 
test situation, a group of subjects viewed the filmed interviews, and 
then made judgments regarding each interviewees personality. Cline and 
Richards concluded that while their results identified two independent 
components of accuracy in person perception it was nevertheless meaning-
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ful to regard the ability to perceive others accurately as ~ general 
trait. 
Supporting Cline and Richard's conclusion, Taft (1955) had earlier 
published a complete review of findings related to correlates of the a-
bility to judge others. Overall, Taft concluded, as Allport (1937, p. 
512) had suggested that while a person's ability to accurately judge 
others is in part a function of the specific situation the judgment is 
made in, there is nonetheless reason to consider this ability more of a 
general trait. than as a specific one. Taft summarized his literature re-
view by suggesting that: 
The following characteristics are fairly consistently found to be 
positively correlated with the ability to accurately judge person-
ality characteristics of others: a) age in children; b) high intel-
ligence and academic ability (with analytic judgment especially); 
c) specialization in the physical sciences; d) esthetic and dramatic 
interests; e) insight into ones peers on specific traits; f) good 
emotional adjustment and integration (analytic tasks only); and g) 
social skills (only with tests of ability to predict subjects' be-
havior). The ability to judge correlates negatively with judges 
social dependence and his 'psychasthenic' score on the M}WI. Char-
acteristics showing fairly consistent lack of correlation are age 
(in adults), sex, and training in psychology. Some possible rela-
tionships on which more evidence is required ••. are number of older 
siblings [negatively correlated with accuracy], literary ability 
[positively correlated with accuracy] and being a clinical psychol-
ogist [negatively correlated with accuracy] (p. 20). 
More recently, Hunt and Lin (1967) investigated subjects' accura-
cy in judging personal attributes after listening to tape recordings of 
stimulus persons. The authors concluded that "our findings do provide 
evidence of accurate judgment of personal attributes from speech, and 
also some evidence of consistency of individual performance across sam-
ples of speech expressive of quite dissimilar personalities" (p. 452). 
In addition, Hunt and Lin found no reliable relationships between judg-
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u1ental accuracy and whether the judge was open- or closed-minded. 
These findings serve as background for the conceptualization of the 
present study. Specifically, it was decided that the veracity construct 
_would be operationalized by tape recordings of persons encouraging (or 
discouraging) others to (or from) participating in an "experiment". The 
method employed to generate these lies and truths led a subject to be-
lieve he/she was actually helping the experimenter by advocating a cer-
tain position. In addition, it was decided to present the lies and 
truths via audio-tapes so as to exclude visual cues. This decision fol-
lowed Maier and Jansen's (1968) and, more recently, Krauss, Geller, and 
Olson's (Note 2) findings that listeners are significantly more accurate 
than watchers. Thus to increase the likelihood that subjects would show 
variation in their judging ability a listening task was chosen for this 
dissertation that prior research suggested should maximally discriminate 
among human lie detectors. 
The work of Vernon and Cline (1960) and of Taft (1955) lends sup-
port to the plausibility of the general hypothesis that there are pat-
terns of individual differences associated with judgmental accuracy in 
human lie detection. Based upon this reasoning, and upon a review of 
literature relating specific personological variables to general judg-
m~~ntal accuracy, the following set of variables was chosen to serve as 
predictor variables for judgmental accuracy in human lie detection: 
(a) Field dependence/independence; 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
General intelligence; 
Social intelligence; 
Extroversion; 
(e) Neuroticism; 
(f) Repression/Sensitization; 
(g) Locus of control; 
(h) Dogmatism; 
(i) Artistic interests; and 
(j) Demographic and background variables. 
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In addition, a new method employed was devised to provide real 
lies and truths which subject-perceivers would later judge for veracity. 
This method was devised with the intention of broadening the knowledge 
currently available regarding the external and construct validity of hu-
man lie detection investigations. 
Hypothesized Correlates of Judgmental Accuracy 
Field Dependence/Independence. Gary (1967) stated that, "in a 
field-dependent mode,perception is inferred to be strongly dominated by 
the overall organization of the field, whereas in a field-independent 
mode the parts of the field seem to be experienced as discrete from the 
organized background and can be organized separately" (p. 5190). Gary 
investigated the implications of this statement within the context of 
susceptibility to social influence. His results indicated no relation-
ship between field dependence/independence and susceptibility. Night-
engale (1967), on the other hand, reasoned (on the basis of early inves-
tigations) that field dependent persons are more oriented towards inter-
personal cues than are field independent ones and therefore would show 
superior judgmental accuracy. In general, this study also produced null 
results. 
These conflicting hypotheses are not unlike the ones encountered 
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while performing a recent investigation of field dependence/independence 
and other-race recognition (Lavrakas, Buri and Mayzner, in press). In 
this instance there were past findings to support both sides of the 
field dependence/independence hypothesis. For the present study it was 
reasoned that the listener's role in human lie detection is not unlike 
the visual task in traditional field dependence/independence measures 
i.e., one must make a decision about some specific aspects in the entire 
stimulus-field despite the presence of a "distracting" background. The 
parallel is that the listener in human lie detection must also make a 
judgment which may be based upon the evaluation of specific aspects of 
the speaker's behavior, which the listener may distinguish from the~­
stalt. It then follows that field independent individuals may be better 
able to distinguish specific cues on which to base their judgments of 
honesty or dishonesty. As such, it is hypothesized that field independ-
ent persons will demonstrate superior accuracy as listeners in human 
lie detection. This hypothesis is also in accordance with Taft's (1956) 
findings that field independence was marginally related to the ability 
to accurately judge others. 
General Intelligence. Allport (1937), in reviewing earlier inves-
tigations of the relationship between judgmental accuracy in person per-
ception and general intelligence, concluded that "understanding people 
is largely a matter of perceiving the relationship between past and 
present activity, between expressive behavior and inner traits, between 
cause and effect, and general intelligence is the ability to perceive 
just such relationships as these" (p. 514). In a similar vein, Levan-
thai (1957) suggested: 
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The predictions of an observer about behavior of another person are 
a product of the observer's hypothesis or conceptualization regard-
ing a particular individual. The accuracy of his predictions de-
pends upon the validity of the conceptualizations. His hypotheses 
are, in turn, a function of the information available about the per-
son to be judged, and of the judge's typical way of categorizing or 
forming concepts about others {p. 176). 
These statements of Allport and Levanthal suggest that general intelli-
gence may be positively related to judgmental accuracy in human lie de-
tection. This hypothesis is based upon the following reasoning. In de-
ciding whether or not to believe a speaker, a listener must put a prior-
ity on the importance of the speaker~s behavior rues within a specific 
interaction. The listener then may make decisions based upon his/her 
evaluation of the most important cues. It is therefore hypothesized that 
persons high in general intelligence will make such decisions with super-
ior accuracy than those relatively lower in general intelligence. 
Social Intelligence. Taft {1955) concluded that judging ability 
appeared to be a combination of general intelligence and social intel-
ligence. It follows from this and from common sense that a person who 
is high in social intelligence, i.e., a person who can accurately assess 
the dynamics of interpersonal behavior, should also be capable of accu-
rately assessing the gestalt of a verbal exchange. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that persons high in social intelligence will be more ac-
curate as perceivers in human lie detection than persons who are rela-
tively lower in social intelligence. 
Extroversion. Taft (1956) and Vingoe and Antonof (1968) reported 
results that extroversion was negatively correlated with the ability to 
accurately judge others. Taft suggested that a less extroverted person 
is more socially detached and thereby may be more objective in his/her 
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social judgment. This reasoning can be extended to suggest that an ex-
troverted person is more likely to be actively engaged in social rela-
tions and, therefore, less likely to take time to "see what's going on". 
On the other hand, a more 'introverted person is less likely to be ac-
tively engaged in social relations and may, in his/her detachment, de-
velop a clearer perspective of the underlying dynamics of the social 
situation he/she is observing. While this extension of reasoning is 
speculative it is none-the-less hypothesized that persons lower in ex-
troversion (i.e., more introverted) will have superior judgmental ac~ 
curacy in human lie detection than those persons relatively higher in 
extroversion. 
Neuroticism. Taft (1955, 1956) and Vingoe and Antonof (1968) 
also found evidence to support their hypothesis that well-adjusted, emo-
tionally stable persons show a superior ability to accurately judge oth-
ers than do relatively neurotic, emotionally unstable persons. Taft 
(1955) reasoned that: "the well-adjusted person is less subject to pro-
jecting himself into others than the poorly adjusted person and there-
fore is able to judge better" (p. 13). In accordance with this reason-
ing it is hypothesized that stable, well-adjusted persons will show a 
superior judgmental accuracy in human lie detection than would a more 
neurotic person. 
Repression/Sensitization. In a review article of repression/ 
sensitization as a dimension of personality, Byrne (1964) described 
Repressors as individuals who have difficulty perceiving threatening 
material accurately due to an avoidance of anxiety arousing stimuli. 
·sensitizors, on the other hand, are individuals who "perceive threaten-
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ing stimuli as accurately or more accurately than neutral stimuli" (p. 
172). This may be due to their approach toward anxiety arousing stimu-
li. Within the context of human lie detection it is reasonable to sug-
gest that the potential of being lied to can be threatening to the lis-
tener, i.e., the listener may receive false information, in addition to 
being duped by a liar. As such it is hypothesized that Repressors will 
react to the task of judging veracity with more avoidance behavior, which 
in turn will make them less sensitive to the speaker's cues. Sensiti-
zers, on the other hand, should show more approach behavior to the speak-
er's cues, thereby being more accurate in judging veracity than repres-
sors. 
Locus-of-Control. McDonald (1973) in reviewing the locus-of-con-
trol literature concluded that "internals engage in more instrumental 
goal-directed activity, whereas externals more often manifest emotional 
non-goal-directed responses" (p. 171). Following from this it was rea-
soned that an internally controlled person will, as a listener, be more 
likely to focus on the relevant speaker cues in human lie detection. 
An"externally controlled person, on the other hand, should be more like-
ly to approach lie detection in a more emotional, less goal-directed man-
ner. Thus, it is hypothesized that individuals with an internal locus-
of-control will be more accurate in judging veracity than individuals 
with an external locus-of-control. 
Dogmatism. Rokeach (1960) described the openness of one's belief 
system as "the extent to which a person can receive, evaluate, and act 
on relevant information received from the outside on its own intrinsic 
merits, unemcumbered by irrelevant factors in the situation arising from 
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within the person or from the outside" (p. 57). This open/closed mind-
edness dimension corresponds to low-dogmatism and high-dogmatism, respec-
tively. As was earlier mentioned, Hunt and Lin (1967) had found no re-
lationship between open/closed mindedness and the ability to accurately 
judge people in general person perception. In addition, another study, 
in which the person perception task was operationalized differently from 
Hunt and Lin, found no relationship between accuracy and dogmatism 
(Sawatzky and Zingle, 1969). Despite these null results, it was rea-
soned that an open minded listener may be more open to the entire ge-
stalt of the speaker in human lie detection. Thus it is hypothesized 
that open minded (i.e., less dogmatic) persons will more accurately 
judge veracity in human lie detection than will close-minded (i.e., more 
dogmatic) persons. 
Artistic Interests. Taft (1955) concluded that the ability to 
judge others seems to be higher in those persons who have dramatic and 
artistic interests. Taft's conclusion concurred with the findings of 
Hastorf, Schneider and Poletka (1970) in their review of past findings 
linking artistic interests with judgmental accuracy. The assumption un-
derlying this relationship appears to be that persons with high artistic 
interest are more likely to be "sensitive" people i.e., by having an ap-
preciation for the arts and their subtleties, such a person may also 
have an general appreciation for the subtleties of human emotions. 
Following from this speculation, it is hypothesized that persons with 
high artistic interest will be more "sensitive" as listeners in human 
lie detection and will perform more accurately than persons with less 
artistic interest. 
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Demographic and Background Variables. From an exploratory and de-
scriptive standpoint the inclusion of certain demographic and background 
variables as predictors is deemed appropriate. The effect of birth or-
der and family size upon an individual has been a continual interest of 
psychology. In addition to such sibling information other basic demo-
graphic information, e.g., sex, age, years of schooling, etc., and fami-
ly background information is hypothesized to possibly be related to 
judgmental accuracy in human lie detection. Another area of a person's 
background that is speculated as possibly being related to accuracy is a 
person's habits with regard to reading, television, and movie going. 
Finally it is hypothesized that a person's own attitudes toward religion 
and moral issues may relate to his/her accuracy in human lie detection. 
In general these hypotheses were speculative (based upon my own 
conjecture). Therefore no statement is advanced to the direction (posi-
tive or negative correlation) of any relationships between those demo-
graphic and background variables and accuracy in human lie detection. 
Interpersonal Trust and Judgmental Accuracy 
The investigation of listeners' judgmental accuracy in human lie 
detection is also an indirect investigation of listeners' trust of the 
speakers. Interpersonal trust, as defined by Rotter (1971), is an in-
dividual's generalized expectancy that "the word, promise, verbal or 
written statement of another .•. can be relied upon" (p. 444); this cor-
responds to what Giffin (1967) refers to as the reliability dimension 
in interpersonal trust as it relates to the communication process. 
Given the obvious reality that humans do not differentiate lies from 
truths with the same ease and accuracy they differentiate white from 
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black or hot from cold, it is hypothesized that listeners will show a 
tendency to be more trusting in their average judgments than distrusting. 
This hypothesis follows in part from a consideration of the accultura-
tion to presume innocence 'when in doubt, and from the conjecture that 
listeners in general would rather be duped by a liar than disbelieve a 
truth teller if, as operationalized in the present study, they have noth-
ing to lose by being mistaken. In addition to this reasoning, a pilot 
study for the present dissertation, employing a similar methodology, 
found listeners (when confronted wit~ an ambiguons 2 judgment task) showed 
a tendency to be more trusting than distrusting. 
As individual difference measures were to be collected to investi-
gate their relationship to judgmental accuracy, it was reasoned that 
some of these same measures may relate to the degree of trust a listener 
demonstrates in human lie detection. In addition, the aforementioned pi-
lot study found a significant correlation between the degree of trust 
listeners showed and their degree of Machiavellianism and level of trust-
worthiness of others. To this end, the following constructs were chosen 
to serve as predictor variables for interpersonal trust: 
(a) Trustworthiness of Others; 
(b) Dogmatism; 
(c) Machiavellianism; and 
(d) Background and Demographic Variables. 
2Specifically the ambiguity of the pilot study's judgment task 
resulted from listeners being told that the set of honest/dishonest tape-
recordings they were to judge could contain any proportion of lies and/ 
or truths. 
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Trustworthiness of Others. A person's general belief of the de-
gree others are trustworthy has been investigated by Rotter (1966) and 
Wrightsman (1974), who both developed scales to measure this dimension. 
Their results indicate that people do show variance on this dimension. 
Wrightsman (1966) also reports results that indicate that persons who in 
general regard others as more trustworthy, reflect this disposition in 
their behavior. In the present study, it was reasoned that those per-
sons who have a high level of trustworthiness of others, will reflect it 
in their judgments regarding veracity. Specifically, it is hypothesized 
that persons high in trustworthiness of others will be more trusting in 
their judgments than persons low in trustworthiness of others. 
Dogmatism. Deutsch (1960) found that "in an ambiguous situation 
involving the choice of trusting or not .•. low authoritarians are more 
likely to be trusting ••. while high authoritarians are more likely to be 
suspicious" (p. 140). The notion of dogmatism was advanced by Rokeach 
(1960) as a suitable way to conceptualize £~neral authoritarianism. As 
such it was reasoned that dogmatism (general authoritarianism) may re-
late to the general trust or distrust a listener showed in his/her judg-
ment of veracity. Specifically, it is hypothesized that persons low in 
dogmatism will be more trusting in their judgments than persons high in 
dogmatism. 
Machiavellianism. As previously mentioned, a pilot study for this 
dissertation indicated a significant relationship between Hachiavellian-
ism and the general level of trust in listeners' judgments. This ex-
ploratory hypothesis had been advanced by R.A. Haier (Note 3) on the 
following reasoning: 
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Machiavellianism (Christi, 1968) refers to the degree that a person 
feels others are manipulable in interpersonal situations. Christi 
had found that a person who regards others as highly manipulable 
will in turn be more likely to be manipulating in his/her personal 
behavior. It was therefore speculated that high Machiavellians may 
project themselves into their judgment of others, in a way as to make 
high Machiavellians more suspicious of others' true intentions. 
Following from this, it is hypothesized that listeners who are low in 
Machiavellianism will be more trusting in their judgment of the honest 
and dishonest tape-recordings than will persons high in Machiavellianism. 
Demographic and Background Variables. Rotter (1971) reviewed past 
research relating individual differences to behavioral trust or distrust 
shown toward others. He cited findings that youngest children, and ag-
nostics and atheists are less trusting of others. Other than these re-
sults, most experimental research investigating behavioral trust has fo-
cused primarily on the situational determinants of trust/distrust (e.g., 
Wrightsman, 1966). Because of this relative dearth of past findings re-
garding the relationship between demographic-background variables and 
behavioral trust/distrust, no specific directional hypotheses are ad-
vanced for the present study. 
Differential Trust. The aforementioned pilot study also indicated 
that listeners, as a group, judged one stimulus person in a manner in-
consistent with their judgments of the other stimulus persons. An in-
vestigation of this indicated that the "deviant" stimulus person's 
speech had an accent which was markedly different from the other stirnu-
lus persons' speech. As the stimulus tape-recordings for the present 
study were to be generated at a university with a heterogeneous (racial-
ethnic) undergraduate population, an a priori decision was made to in-
vestigate whether differential trust would be shown toward stimulus per-
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sons with "deviant" accents. Specifically, it is hypothesized that the 
trust shown by listeners in the human lie detection task will be lower 
for the group of stimulus persons with "deviant" accents as compared with 
the ratings of the group df stimulus persons without "deviant" accents. 
This hypothesized construct is here after referred to as differential 
trust. 
Summary 
Specifically, the following hypotheses were advanced in this dis-
sertation: 
(a) Listeners, as a group, will show better-than-chance accuracy in 
judging veracity. 
(b) Field independence will be positively related to judgmental ac-
curacy. 
(c) High general intelligence will be positively related to judgmen-
tal accuracy. 
(d) High social intelligence will be positively related to judgmen-
tal accuracy. 
(e) Extroversion will be negatively related to judgmental accuracy. 
(f) Neuroticism will be negatively related to judgmental accuracy. 
(g) Sensitization will be positively related to judgmental accuracy. 
(h) An internal locus of control will be positively related to judg-
mental accuracy. 
· (i) High dogmatism will be negatively related to judgmental accuracy._ 
(j) High artistic interest will be positively related to judgmental 
accuracy. 
(k) The above mentioned variables will combine in a multiple regres-
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sion procedure to account for more of the variance in judgment-
al accuracy than any one single variable. 
(1) Listeners, as a group, will make average judgments in a more 
trusting, than distrusting, direction. 
(m) Trustworthiness of others will be positively related to trust 
in judgments. 
(n) Low dogmatism will be positively related to trust in judgments. 
(o) High Machiavellianism will be negatively related to trust in 
judgments. 
(p) Listeners, as a group, will show differential trust in their 
judgment of the "deviant" stimulus person, i.e., they will be 
more suspicious of these "deviant" stimuli. 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Participants included 51 females and 52 males ranging from 15 to 
33 years old. These 103 subjects came from five groups: (a) 36 Loyola 
University of Chicago undergraduate volunteers who received credit in 
an introductory psychology course for participation; (h) 27 high school 
students from a history class in Birmingham, Michigan 3 ; (c) 17 persons 
enrolled in a summer session undergraduate statistics course at Loyola 
University; (d) 18 persons enrolled in a summer session undergraduate 
statistics course at St. Xavier's College, Chicago, Illinois; and (e) 5 
adult volunteers. While this sample was not randomly selected it does 
constitute a heterogenous group of primarily caucasian (90%), middle-
class, urban individuals. 
Making of Honest and Dishonest Audio-Tape Stimuli 
Following a procedure that had been used successfully in a pilot 
study a set of 20 tape recordings were made in which a person gave a 
testimony that was either the truth or a lie. It was important, for 
purposes of construct validity, that these taped recordings be actual 
truths and actual lies as opposed to "role-playing" testimonials. The 
manner in which each tape was made was as follows: 
1. A subject entered an experimental room and was informed by the 
experimenter that he/she would be participating in a pilot study for an 
3 I thank Nr. John Petrakis and Mr. John Schultz of E.W. Seaholm 
High School for providing access to these students. 
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experiment that might take place later in the semester. The subject was 
informed that it was the experimenter's intention that this pilot study 
would serve as a practice time for the experimenter, and that the subject 
would provide the experimenter with an indication of how undergraduates 
perform in the subsequent task. At this time the subject was engaged in 
either an "interesting" task (e.g., playing an electric tennis game on 
television) or a "dull" task (e.g., watching the second hand on a timer 
for five minutes). 
2. Following the completion o~ the task, rhe experimenter asked 
the subject to fill out a rating sheet to assess the subject's attitude 
toward the task. The subject was told that this would help the experi-
menter get an impression of how undergraduates react towards this task. 
The rating sheet contained several semantic-differential scales. Of cen-
tral interest was the scale anchored with the words "very interesting" 
and "very dull". Using this rating scale it was possible to determine 
whether a subject had found the task interesting or dull. This was of 
critical importance as it provided the experimenter with a means of ul-
timately determining the subject's veracity. This rating sheet is pre-
sented in Appendix A. 
3. Following the rating of the task, the subject was presented 
with one of two written "cover stories" whereby he/she was asked to give 
an honest or dishonest testimony about the "dull" or "interesting" task. 
By reading the cover story, the subject was led to believe that his/her 
testimony would be played to high school students in order to encourage 
(or discourage) these high school students to (or from) participating 
in the actual experiment. Subjects who said the task was interesting 
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and who had found their task "interesting" were presumably telling the 
truth. Subjects who had found their task "interesting" and who had said 
their task was "dull" were presumably telling a lie. Subjects who had 
found their task dull and ·said that it was "interesting" were presumably 
telling a lie. Finally, subjects who found their task dull and who said 
it was dull were presumably telling the truth. The "cover story" in-
structions which subjects read are presented in Appendix B. In addition 
to these conditions, some subjects were asked to provide their testimony 
in their own words (i.e., "impromptu" tape stimuli) while others were 
asked merely to read the script provided at the end of the cover story 
(i.e., "read" tape stimuli). 
4. When the subject indicated that he/she was ready to record the 
testimony the experimenter started the tape recorder and the subject pro-
ceeded to provide the testimony. 
5. Following the making of the tape recording the subject was giv-
en a second rating sheet (see Appendix A) to assess the subject's atti-
tudes toward making the tape. Of central importance was the scale an-
chored with the words "very honest" and "very dishonest". The rating 
the subject made on this scale presumably indicated whether the subject 
felt he/she had told the truth or had lied. In this way the experimenter 
was able to tell which tapes were truthful and which were lies. 
6. Finally the subject was debriefed and it was explained that the 
experimenter was primarily interested in playing the tape recording to 
other persons to see if these others could determine if the subject had 
been honest or dishonest. Each subject was then asked for his/her per-
·mission to use the recorded testimony. All subjects gave this permission. 
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The above mentioned procedure was employed until the 20 taped-recorded 
stimuli shown in Figure 1 had been generated. 
In order to make these 20-taped stimuli it required approximately 
40 undergraduates to individually perform the above outlined procedure 
(1-6). This was due to the following circumstances. Initially, subjects 
were "randomly" assigned to a tape condition, but some subjects provided 
invalid tapes. This occurred when a subject's rating on the interesting/ 
dull scale and/or the honest/dishonest scale was not clearly in one 
direction. As such, an ~ priori decision was made not to use the sub-
ject's tape, as it did not clearly constitute a valid truth or a valid 
lie. Because of this the tape generating procedure was continued with 
new subjects until all 20 tapes were validly made. There was no observ-
able pattern to the conditions that required more than one subject to 
make a valid tape. 
In summary, 20 tape recordings were made which constituted 10 
truths and 10 lies. I regard these audio-tapes as validly representing 
the constructs "spoken truth" and "spoken lie". This statement is based 
on the fact that two rating scales were used to screen out those tapes 
which did not clearly conform with the validity criteria. 
rh~$~20 taped testimonies were then sorted into two groups: the 
eight "improvised" tapes and the 12 "read-script" tapes. This grouping 
was performed on an ~ priori basis because it was assumed that if sub-
jects listened to the 20 tapes together, they might show biases in rat-
ing the read-script tapes possibly thinking that these tapes were more 
likely to be lies. To avoid the possibility of this bias it was de-
cided that the two groups of tapes would be played separately. 
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Figure 1. Twenty conditions for generating stimulus lies and truths. 
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The eight improvised tapes were randomly sequenced in several or-
ders so that different listeners would hear them in different random or-
ders. A similar random-sequencing was done for the 12 read-script tapes. 
These various sequences were then recorded with a Panasonic cassette re-
corder on a Memorex tape cassette. 
General Procedure 
Subjects, in groups of approximately ten, participated in the fol-
lowing manner (which was in part determined by time constraints, as sub-
jects were unable to participate for more than two hours). 
1. Instructions regarding the general nature of the experiment 
were provided verbally by the experimenter. These instructions ex-
plained that this experiment was an attempt to determine "who is a good 
lie detector". The experimenter also explained that this research was 
important because of its societal implications, and as such subjects 
were asked to sincerely participate to the best of their ability. 
2. Subjects then took the Hidden Figures Test during a seven min-
ute time period. 
3. Subjects next listened to and rated the eight tape-recorded 
"improvised" testimonials. Prior to making their ratings, tape recorded 
instructions were played which acquainted the subjects with the task they 
were to perform. In addition, subjects were provided with an explana-
tion of how the tape recordings had been made. The complete instructions 
are presented in Appendix C. The instructions also stated that the tape 
recordings had been randomly selected from a larger group of tape re-
cordings so as to lead subjects to believe that the specific set of 
tapes that they would listen to might contain any proportion of lies 
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and truths. (In fact, the actual proportion was fifty/fifty.) Subjects 
listened to the taped voices one at a time and had approximately five 
seconds in which to make their own judgment before the next tape was 
played. The experimenter alerted the subjects that the next tape was 
about to begin approximately five seconds after the conclusion of the 
previous tape. The volume of the tape recorder was set loud enough so 
that all the subjects could hear the recordings adequately. 
4. Subjects took the Cartoon Prediction Test during two four-
minute timed intervals. 
5. Subjects responded to Part 2 and Part 3 of the Cattell Culture-
Fair Intelligence Test during timed intervals of two minutes and three 
minutes, respectively. 
6. Subjects then heard tape recorded instructions explaining the 
next task, which was the rating of the "read-script" tape recordings. 
These instructions are similar to those heard prior to the rating of the 
improvised tapes, and are presented in Appendix D. After listening to 
these instructions, subjects listened to and rated the 12 "read-script" 
tapes in a manner similar to their rating of the eight "improvised" 
tapes. 
7. Subjects, finally, were given a packet of personological in-
ventories. They were instructed to complete it at their own leisure, 
but to return it as soon as possible. This packet included: (a) the 
Maudsley Personality Inventory; (b) a locus-of-control scale; (c) a dog-
matism scale; (d) a trust worthiness of others scale; (e) a Machia-
vellianism scale; (f) an artistic interest inventory; (g) a demographic 
and background questionnaire; and (h) a modified repression/sensitiza-
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tion scale. The packet in most instances was returned to the experimen-
ter within one week. In all, subjects spent approximately 50 minutes 
participating in parts 1-6 and approximately one hour, at their leisure, 
responding to the packet of questionnaires. 
Dependent Variables 
The 20 tape recordings were rated using a scale (shown in Figure 
2) similar to Maier and Jansen (1967). This scale provides each subject 
an opportunity to record his/her judgment of veracity, and his/her degree 
of confidence in the judgment. 
Accuracy Score. Based on the actual scale ratings, each subject 
received an "accuracy score" which was computed by assigning a subject 
a "1" for each of the 20 stimulus tapes whose veracity was correctly 
judged. For example, if a tape were a lie and a subject marked the "ly-
ing" half of the scale the subject received a "1". On the other hand, 
if the tape were a truth and the subject marked a "lying" half of the 
scale, the subject received a "0". In this way an Accuracy Score was 
computed for each subject by summing his/her accuracy scores for each of 
the 20 judgments. This Accuracy Score could range from 0 (indicating a 
subject was incorrect on all 20 tapes) to 20 (indicating perfect ac-
curacy). 
Confidence Score. For every tape rating a subject had the option 
of whether he/she was "uncertain", "suspect", or "certain" in the judg-
ment. By assigning a "1" to each uncertain rating, a "2" to each sus-
pect rating, and a "3" to each certain rating, a "confidence score" 
was determined for every tape rating. By summing a subject's 20 confi-
dence scores a Confidence Score was generated which reflects how confi-
I am certain this person is lying. 
I suspect this person is lying. 
I am uncertain but guess that this person is lying. 
I am uncertain but guess this person is telling the truth. 
I suspect this person is telling the truth. 
I am certain this person is telling the truth. 
Figure 2. Rating scale used by listeners to judge stimuli. 
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dent a subject was in his/her total ratings. This confidence score could 
range from 20 (indicating all uncertain ratings) to 60 (indicating all 
certain ratings). 
Trust Score. In making their tape ratings subjects were led to be-
lieve that the set of tapes they were listening to could contain any pro-
portion of lies or truths. Considering these directions subjects were 
left with an ambiguous task: that is, they had to rely totally upon 
their own judgment in order to determine whether they should use the 
truth or lie half of the rating scale. Thus, it was possible for sub-
jects to differ in the amount of "trust" they displayed in their ratings, 
i.e., which part of the scale they used more often. Therefore, a "trust 
score" from "1" to "6" was assigned for each judgment a subject made. A 
"1" was assigned for "certain this person is lying", a "2 11 was assigned 
for "suspect this person is lying", ... , and a "6" was assigned for "cer-
tain this person is telling the truth". A Trust Score was then computed 
by summing a subject's "trust scores" for the 20-judgments. This Trust 
Score could range from 20 (indicating a total usage of the "I am certain 
this person is lying" response) to 120 (indicating a total usage of the 
"I am certain this person is telling the truth" response). 
Subject Variables 
During the experimental session and later at their own leisure 
subjects provided personological information to be used as independent 
variables for the subsequent analyses. 
Field Dependence/Independence. Field dependence/independence was 
measured using the Hidden Figures Test (Thurstone and Jeffreys, 1965); 
this inventory has a split-half reliability of .95. Due to a time 
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restriction it was necessary to reduce the time period for administering 
this test to seven minutes as oposed to the 10 minutes intended for the 
full test. This time alteration limited the range of the scores and prob-
ably decreased the variance. Despite these numerical restrictions there 
is no reason to believe that the shortened time lessened the construct 
validity. The full test requires a subject to make 196 decisions, and 
is scored right minus wrong. For each decision a subject must first 
view a figure (i.e., some geometric design) and then indicate whether 
that figure is or is not contained in a separate drawing (i.e., a more 
detailed geometric design). High scores on this inventory represent 
field independence and low scores represent field independence. 
Social Intelligence. The Cartoon Prediction Test (O'Sullivan and 
Guilford, 1966) was used to measure social intelligence (split-half re-
liability of .70). This test is made up of two 15-item parts, each of 
which a subject has four minutes to complete. Each item requires a sub-
ject to first view a stimulus cartoon picture then choose one of three 
alternative pictures which would most likely happen next. Scores on this 
test can range from 0 to 30, with high scores indicating high social in-
telligence. 
General Intelligence. A general intelligence score for each sub-
ject was computed by summing the scores on Part 2 and Part 3 from Form 
B, Scale 2, of the Cattell Culture-Fair I.Q. Test (Cattell and Cattell, 
1960); the entire test has split-half reliability of .91. While the 
complete test has four parts only two of the four parts were used be-
cause of time constraints. In addition, the time subjects were permit-
.ted to work on the two tests was restricted to three and two minutes, 
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respectively, as compared with the four and three minutes recommended in 
the test manual. Part 2 contains 14 items each of which requires a sub-
ject to determine which of five patterns do not fit with the other four. 
Part 3 consists of 12 items, each of which requires a subject to deter-
mine which one of five alternative patterns best completes a large stim-
ulus pattern. The total score for these two parts can range from 0 to 
26 with high scores representing high general intelligence. 
Extroversion and Neuroticism. The Maudsley Personality Inventory 
(Eysenck, 1962) was used to measure introversion/extroversion and neuro-
ticism. The inventory is made up of two intermingled scales of 24 items 
each. For each item a subject read a statement and then indicated wheth-
er the statement was true, uncertain, or false as a description of him-
self/herself. Possible scores on both scales can range from 0 to 48. 
High scores on the extroversion/introversion scale represent extreme 
extroversion, and high scores on the neuroticism scale represent high 
neuroticism. A subject responds to the MPI at his/her own pace. 
Locus-of-Control. Locus-of-Control was measured by Rotter's 
(1966) I.E. Inventory; this has a test-retest reliability of .72. The 
test consist of 29 items, eight of which are fillers. For each item a 
subject selects one of two statements that he/she believes to be more 
true. The test provides scores which range from 0 to 21; low scores 
identify persons with an internal locus-of-control and high scores ident-
ify persons with an external locus-of-control. 
Machiavellianism. The Mach IV inventory (Christi, 1968) measures 
the degree to which an individual feels others are manipulable in inter-
personable interactions (split-half reliability of .79). This scale 
consists of 20 likert-format items. Scores can range from 20 to 120 
with high scores representing persons high in Machiavellianism. 
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Dogmatism. The Short Dogmatism Scale (Schultz, 1962) was used to 
measure dogmatism (reproduction co-efficient of .83). It consists of 10 
likert-format items which were selected from Rokeach's D-scale (1960) 
for best meeting the criteria of unidimentionality, item consistency, and 
reproducibility. Scores can range from 10 to 60, with high scores re-
presenting persons high in dogmatism. 
Trustworthiness of Others. This was measured by the Trustworthi-
ness Scale from the Philosophy of Human Nature inventory (Wrightsman, 
1964). The Trustworthiness scale measures the extent to which people 
are seen as moral, honest, and reliable (both split-half and test-retest 
reliability of .74). It is made up of seven positively and seven nega-
tively worded likert-format items. Scores can range from 14 to 84 with 
high scores indicating a person who believes that others are highly 
trustworthy. 
Artistic Interest. The degree to which a person has an interest in 
"art" was measured by an improvised scale which I constructed (see Ap-
pendix E). This was necessary because other available instruments re-
quired corporate-scoring forms which I did not choose to purchase. By 
using results presented in the Strong Vocational Interest Blank test 
manual (1968) it was possible to identify 10 occupation types which show 
a strong positive correlation with artistic interests, and 9 occupational 
types which show strong negative correlations with artistic interests. 
These occupational types were then presented in written format to sub-
jects who were asked to indicate whether they would "like", "be indif-
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ferent to", or "dislike" working in a particular occupation. A score 
was then computed for each subject by assigning a "2" for each "like" 
response, and a "1" for each "indifferent" response to the occupational 
types which were positively correlated with artistic interests, and by 
assigning a "2" for each "dislike" response and a "1" for each "indif-
ferent" response for the occupational types which were negatively cor-
related with artistic interests. Following from this, scores could 
range from 0 to 38. As this was the first time the scale was used; its 
reliability is unknown. 
Repression/Sensitization. The personality dimension of repression/ 
sensitization was to be measured by a shortened version of Byrne's 
(1961) scale for this construct. The full scale consists of 127 items 
from the }rupl and has test-retest reliability of .82. Due to time con-
straints, a random set of 20 of these items was chosen for use. Sub-
jects were presented these items in written format and were asked to in-
dicate whether the statements were true or false for them. Long after 
these data were collected it was discovered that the version of the 
}rupi (1970) from which I originally sampled the 20 items, was not num-
bered in a manner consistent with Byrne's items numbering (taken from 
the original 1943 MMPI). As such, only 6 of the 20 items I employed 
actually carne from the R/S scale. Due to this mistake no valid R/S 
scores were available for use in the analyses, and thus the R/S hypothe-
sis is not testable. 
Demographic and Background Questionnaire. A personal history and 
miscellaneous attitudes questionnaire was constructed in order to gather 
this type of information. In general the questionnaire consisted of 
descriptive items (e.g., age, sex, number of siblings), personal habits 
and experience items (e.g., number of hours of TV watched per day) 
and some miscellaneous religious and moral attitudes items. This in-
ventory is presented in Appendix F. 
47 
RESULTS 
Subject Reliability 
Inspection of frequency tables for the dependent and independent 
variables, led to a decision to drop three subjects from the analyses. 
One subject showed no variance in his judgments of the tape recordings, 
which suggests he deliberately made an insincere effort. An acquain-
tance_of mine, who served as a subject, scored in a deviantly high man-
ner on some of the independent measures, leading me to believe that he 
may have taken and/or scored these inventories before. A third subject 
to be dropped was a student of mine. This subject, due to partial paral-
ysis, is not able to perform on timed tasks in a manner that validly re-
flects her ability. Due to this it was felt best to drop her from the 
final sample. Deletion of these three subjects left a sample of SO fe-
males and SO males for the subsequent analyses. All results described 
in this report will therefore be based on a sample size of 100. 
Description of Subject Variables Data Set 
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the various 
personological variables. In general there is adequate heterogeneity of 
scores on all of these variables. 
Ratings of Honest/Dishonest Tape Stimuli 
Accuracy Scores. An Accuracy Score was calculated for each sub-
ject representing the total number of tapes he/she correctly judged. 
This score could range from 0 to 20. (The rationale for combining the 
20 ratings into one Accuracy Score is presented in Appendix G.) The 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations of Subject Variables 
Variable 
Field Dependence/Independence 
Social Intelligence 
General Intelligence 
Extroversion 
Neuroticism 
Locus of Control 
Dogmatism 
Artistic Interests 
Trustworthiness of Others 
Machiavellianism 
Age in Years 
How Religious 
Degree of Personal Moral Code 
Average # Hours Read per Day 
Average # Hours TV per Day 
Average # Movies per Month 
# Shakespearean Plays Read 
# Years of Education 
II Siblings 
Mean 
68.14 
23.44 
15.57 
27.95 
26.36 
10.95 
34.32 
21.78 
49.13 
63.71 
20.16 
5.43 
7.09 
2.56 
1.77 
1. 50 
4.19 
13.36 
2.76 
SD 
16.57 
4.31 
2.89 
9.43 
9.37 
4.36 
6.11 
5.53 
9.62 
11.12 
4.24 
2.49 
1.88 
1. 80 
1. 46 
1.05 
3.81 
2.08 
2.35 
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observed sample mean of the Accuracy Score distribution is 10.89 with 
a standard deviation of 2.39. This mean can be subdivided into the fol-
lowing submeans: (a) a mean of 4.08 (sd=l.285) correct for the ratings 
of the eight non-accented '"read" testimonies; (b) a mean of 4.480 (sd= 
1.418) correct for the ratings of the eight non-accented "improvised" 
testimonies; and (c) a mean of 2.330 (sd=.933) correct for the rating of 
the four accented "read" testimonies. 
As the probability that a person will be correct-by-chance on any 
one judgment is .5, the expected value of the Accuracy Score on the ba-
' 
sis of chance would be 10 correct or E(X) = 10. Similarly the expected 
value of the mean of the distribution of Accuracy Scores would also be 
10 or E(M) = 10. In order to compare the observed mean (10.89) with the 
expected mean (10.00), a one sample ~-test was performed. This value 
(~(99) = 3.724, E(.OOl) is high significant and supports the~ priori 
hypothesis that people, in general, have a better-than-chance ability to 
listen to a tape recording and accurately judge a speaker's veracity. 
Comparison of the observed frequency distribution of Accuracy 
Scores with the expected (on the basis of chance) frequency distribution 
is shown in Figure 3 and Table 2. Inspection of this figure and table 
supports the conclusion that peoples' ability to accurately judge verac-
ity is better-than-chance (~(20) = 33.5, E(.03). This is illustrated 
in Figure 3 by the general displacement of the observed Accuracy Score 
distribution toward the high accuracy end of the abscissa. In addition, 
the observed frequency distribution of Accuracy Scores is negatively 
0 Observed ~ccuracy X Expected Accuracy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Accuracy Scores 
Figure 3. Expected and observed frequency distributions of 
Accuracy Scores. 
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Table 2 52 
Expected versus Observed Frequencies of Accuracy Scores 
Accuracy Score Expected f Observed f 
0 0.0 0 
1 0.0 0 
2 0.0 0 
3 0.0 0 
4 0.5 1 
5 1.5 1 
6 3.7 2 
7 7.4 4 
8 12.0 8 
9 16.0 14 
10 17.6 13 
11 16.0 10 
12 12.0 18 
13 7.4 16 
14 3.7 9 
15 1.5 4 
16 0.5 0 
17 0.0 0 
18 0.0 0 
19 0.0 0 
20 o.o 0 
N=lOO.O N=lOO 
Note. t (20) = 33.50, p < .03. 
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skewed~. Figure 3, then, demonstrates that it is not merely the central 
tendency of the distribution that is above the expected chance value, 
but the entire distribution is, in general, more accurate than chance. 
These results represent significant findings, yet it is important 
to put them into the perspective of "meaningfulness". While it has been 
found t~at people are significantly better at differentiating honesty 
from dishonesty than chance-expectation, it is important to note the 
size of this significant difference. Table 3 shows the percentage of 
accurate judgments for each of the 20 taped stimnli; these percentages 
range from 32% correct to 77% correct with an overall mean accuracy of 
54.45% correct. This observed mean percentage exceeds the expected per-
centage (50%) by only 4.45%. This difference is obviously not a large 
one. Therefore it is necessary to explicitly state that while the sub-
jects, as a group, showed a significantly more accurate-than-chance a-
bility to make their judgments, their average percentage correct is not 
impressive in absolute size. 
Trust Scores. A Trust Score was computed for each subject by 
summing his/her rating on each of the 20 six-point judgment scales. 
This was done irrespective of the accuracy of the judgment. This Trust 
Score, therefore, reflects how "trusting" a subject was of the entire 
stimulus set. While the Trust Scores could range from 20 to 120, the 
observed range of the Trust Scores was 56-90. This observed distribu-
tion has a mean of 73.50 and a standard deviation of 7.386. 
~Follo.wi•nga test of skewness (Snedecor and Cochran, 1967, p. 86) 
is was determined that the observed frequency distribution of Accuracy 
Scores is significantly skewed to the left (skewness statistic = -.424, 
one-tailed ..E. ( .05). 
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Percentage of Accurate Judgments for the 20 Stimuli 
Stimulus Tape Description Percentage Correct 
1 male-read-lie 58% 
2 female~ read-lie 32% 
3 male-read-lie 37% 
4 female-read-lie 43% 
5 male-read-truth 45% 
6 female-read-truth 67% 
7 male-read-truth 61% 
8 female-read-truth 65% 
9 male-improvised-lie 36% 
10 female-improvised-lie 59% 
11 male-improvised-lie 59% 
12 female-improvised-lie 51% 
13 male-improvised-truth 41% 
14 female-improvised-truth 63% 
15 male-improvised-truth 77% 
16 female-improvised-truth 62% 
17 accent-male-lie 49% 
18 accent-female-lie 63% 
19 accent-male-truth 58% 
20 accent-female-truth 63% 
Note. Average percentage of correct judgments is 54.45%. 
The expected value of this distribution can be looked at from 
three perspectives. First, if a subject were randomly responding to 
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the tape ratings, it would be expected that his/her Trust Score would 
equal 70, i.e., an average of 3.5 on each of the 20 scale ratings. 
Secondly, if a subject rated all of the tapes accurately and with "cer-
tainty" he/she would also receive a score of 70, i.e., a "1" for the 10 
lie tapes and a "6" for the 10 true tapes. Third, if a subject were un-
certain as to what proportion of tapes were lies and what proportions 
were truths he/she could take a 50/50 chance strRtegy. Following this 
strategy, a subject would also be expected to score 70. These then are 
three lines of reasoning which lead to the same 11 expected value". The 
observed Trust Score mean of 73.5 deviates from the value of 70 in a 
"trusting" direction. By this, it is meant that subjects were more 
trusting than distrusting in their judgments. A one sample t-test shows 
this difference to be significant (.!_ (99) = 4. 739, E.<. 001). 
In attempting to explain the significant difference it appears most 
likely that subjects, when faced with an ambiguous and difficult task, 
had a tendency to show inconsistent accuracy in their ratings and, in 
general, showed a slight, but significant tendency to be more trusting 
than distrusting in their total set of judgments. 
Confidence Scores. A Confidence Score was computed for each sub-
ject, which indicated the overall degree of 11 certainty11 a subject showed 
in his/her judgments. This score could range from 20-60. Had a subject 
shown no consistency in the degree of certainty of his/her judgments the 
expected value of this Confidence Score would be 40. In the same way, 
if the subjects as a group, showed no similarity in the degree of cer-
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tainty the expected mean of the observed Confidence Score distribution 
would have also been 40. This value would represent the average rating 
on a given tape being made with a medium degree of confidence. The 
scores in the observed distribution ranged from 20-55 with a mean of 
36.49 and a standard deviation of 6.74. A 99% confidence interval shows 
that one can be 99% certain that the mean of the Confident Scores falls 
within the 34.75-38.23 interval. As such it appears that while subjects 
as a group showed slightly less than medium certainty in their judgments, 
they did not feel they were merely guessing. This finding is also re-
flected in Table 4, which shows that of the total 2000 judgments, 17.20% 
were "certain", 48.05% were "suspect", and 34.75 were uncertain. 
Differential Trust. By comparing the average trust score for the 
16 non-accented tapes with the average trust score for the four accented 
tapes it is possible to compute a difference score which shall be re-
ferred to as "Differential Trust". Subtracting a subject's mean rating 
of the non-accented tapes from the subject's mean rating of the accented 
tapes provides a negative difference for a subject who was more trusting 
of the non-accented tapes, and a positive difference for a subject who 
was more trusting of the accented tapes. If subjects, as a group, had 
shown no consistent pattern of Differential Trust, the mean of these 
scores would have been zero. The actual mean, -.2437 (sd=.7809) was 
tested for deviation from the expected value using a one sample !=_-test. 
As a group, subjects were less trusting of the accented tapes than they 
were of the non-accented tapes (~_(99) = 3.121, E( .001). This result 
is in the hypothesized direction. (In addition, Appendix H presents re-
-sults relevant to the reliability of the Accent/Non-accent distinction.) 
' 
Table 4 57 
Frequency Distributions of Scaled Judgments 
Certain Suspect Guess Guess Suspect Certain 
Stimulus Tape Lie Lie Lie Truth Truth Truth 
1 (lie) 6 28 24 23 17 2 
2 (lie) 3 11 18 23 34 11 
3 (lie) 7 13 17 23 31 9 
4 (lie) 8 20 15 19 34 4 
5 (truth) 10 25 20 19 17 9 
6 (truth) 4 13 16 7 37 23 
7 (truth) 1 15 23 21 38 2 
8 (truth) 4 15 16 16 33 16 
9 (lie} 7 16 13 19 35 10 
10 (lie) 9 30 20 14 18 9 
11 (lie) 18 27 14 15 21 5 
12 (lie) 10 26 15 16 25 8 
13 (truth) 8 36 15 12 19 10 
14 (truth) 9 22 6 14 31 18 
15 (truth) 7 8 8 13 39 25 
16 (truth) 9 19 10 14 31 17 
17 (lie) 7 25 17 23 22 6 
18 (lie) 12 27 24 20 13 4 
19 (truth) 3 21 18 27 25 6 
20 (truth) 5 16 16 32 28 3 
Totals 147 413 325 370 548 197 
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Correlation Analyses 
A set of Pearson product moment correlations were computed to in-
vestigate the bivariate relationships among the variables. These cor-
relations are displayed in Table 5. Inspection of these results pro-
vides comment on the validity of the hypothesized relationships between 
the criterion variables (Accuracy Score and Trust Score) and the subject-
predictor variables. 
Subjects' ability to judge veracity, as reflected by the Accuracy 
Score, is found to correlate significantly with field dependence/inde-
pendence (..E. = .188, one-tailed ..E.< .03), and social intelligence (..E. = , 
.227, one-tailed ..E.( .01). These results indicate that field independence 
and high social intelligence are, individually, positively correlated 
with the ability to correctly judge veracity. In addition to these hy-
pothesized relationships other personological variables are significant-
ly related to Accuracy Scores: 
(a) The more siblings a person has the less accurate he/she is 
(..E.=-. 203, two-tailed ..E. ( .05). 
(b) The more likely a person has a personal moral code which helps 
him/her make everyday decisions, the more accurate he/she is 
(..E. = • 202, two-tailed ..E. (. 05). 
(c) The greater the average number of hours of television a person 
watches per day, the less accurate he/she is (~ = .243, two-
tailed ..E. ( .05). 
(d) The more Shakespearean plays a person has read, the more accu-
rate the person is (..E.= .203, two-tailed ..E_(.05). 
(e) The more confident a person is in his/her ratings, the more 
Table 5 59 
Intercorrelation Matrix 
AS TS cs FDI SI GI LOC 
Accuracy Score (AS) 
Trust Score (TS) 111 
Confidence Score (CS) *~08 -093 
Field D/I (FDI) *188 -021 072 
Social Intelligence (SI) *~27 -006 -014 103 
General Intelligence (GI) 141 044 008 *uo *~52 
Locus of Control (LOC) -124 100 -095 -084 023 -070 
Neuroticism (NEU) -073 017 -058 -192 
* 
-104 -055 226 
** 
Extraversion (EXT) 044 -149 134 046 079 076 -107 
Machiavellianism (MAC) 060 092 *~14 ;;J99 102 -107 294 *** 
Dogmatism (DOG) 068 042 207 085 159 171 159 
** * 
Trustworthiness (TRU) 024 190 -075 063 -044 -026 -018 
* 
Artistic Interests (AI) -030 -001 -028 028 -057 -037 -055 
Sex (SEX) -080 005 088 000 014 142 048 
Age (AGE) -017 042 -156 -059 -101 -269 -146 
*** 
If Siblings (SIB) -203 -168 -040 055 -035 096 -077 
** * 
Moral Code (MC) 202 045 -051 162 -016 -002 -093 
** 
Religious (REL) 001 044 -138 -103 079 -027 048 
Hours Read (RED) 164 133 -060 022 -075 -103 026 
Hours TV (TV) ;~43 -042 029 -118 119 -029 092 
If Plays (PLA) *~03 -047 -126 *~~4 147 134 *~21 
II Movies (MOV) 147 145 055 *~~8 -025 005 -085 
Note.Correlations are shown without decimal point. 
***.£.(.01, **.£.(.05, *.£.(.10. 
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Intercorrelation Matrix 
NEU EXT MAC DOG TRU AI SEX 
Accuracy Score (AS) 
Trust Score (TS) 
Confidence Score (CS) 
Field D/I (FDI) 
Social Intelligence (SI) 
General Intelligence (GI) 
Locus of Control (LOC) 
Neuroticism (NEU) 
Extraversion (EXT) *211 
Machiavellianism (MAC) 142 -016 
Dogmatism (DOG) 319 -049 156 
*** 
Trustworthiness (TRU) 
-171 071 -504 -154 
* *** 
Artistic Interests (AI) 
-230 066 -265 -008 126 
** ** 
Sex (SEX) 107 -071 212 135 -099 -396 
** *** 
Age (AGE) 
-101 131 -113 -265 045 327 -299 
*** *** "~•** 
II Siblings (SIB) 
-016 001 -154 -160 068 -091 026 
Moral Code (MC) 
-083 -106 -213 032 150 152 -251 
** *** 
Religious (REL) 049 
-p2 130 -080 -352 -101 -057 
*' *** 
Hours Read (RED) 092 013 -036 155 082 283 -212 
** ** 
Hours TV (TV) 277 007 
*** 
019 133 -004 -133 117 
II Plays (PLA) 
-051 069 -201 101 -002 250 -172 
** ** * 
II Movies (MOV) 
-099 134 -057 030 063 084 -038 
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Table 5 
Intercorrelation Matrix 
AGE SIB MC REL RED TV PLA 
Accuracy Score (AS) 
Trust Score (TS) 
Confidence Score (CS) 
Field D/I (FDI) 
Social Intelligence (SI) 
General Intelligence (GI) 
Locus of Control (LOC) 
Neuroticism (NEU) 
Extraversion (EXT) 
Machiavellianism (MAC) 
Dogmatism (DOG) 
Trustworthiness (TRU) 
Artistic Interests (AI) 
Sex (SEX) 
Age (AGE) 
II Siblings (SIB) -061 
Moral Code (MC) *~~1 -107 
Religious (REL) 153 002 -117 
Hours Read (RED) *~16 *~43 *~~9 -103 
Houi:s.~-TV /tTV) -187 
* 
-016 -147 -120 -181 
* 
II Plays-:(:PUJ *~50 -091 *~43 021 *~l9 *~~7 
II Movies (MOV) 059 -156 151 035 078 -056 156 
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accurate the person is (~ = .208, two-tailed E<.OS). 
Regarding the level of trust listeners showed in the tape ratings 
(as operationalized by the Trust Score), few significant relationships 
were found. In fact, of 'the hypothesized relationships, only Trust-
worthiness of Others was found to be significantly related to Trust 
Scores (r = .190, one-tailed £<.03). While this correlation is signifi-
cant its absolute size is surprisingly small. This statement is made in 
light of the fact that the Trustworthiness variable is suppose to reflect 
"how trustworthy one regards others" and the Tru~t Score presumably re-
flects how "trusting" a subject was in his tape ratings 5 • The only other 
variable that is marginally related to Trust Scores is the number of sib-
lings a person has; in this case, persons with more siblings were less 
trusting of the stimulus tapes than were subjects with fewer siblings 
(E = -.168, two-tailed E (.10). 
Regression Analyses of Judgmental Accuracy 
In order to determine the best combination of subject variables 
for prediction of Accuracy Scores, a stepwise multiple regression analy-
sis was performed. Before this analysis was performed a post hoc de-
cision was made to investigate the relationship between Accuracy Scores 
and the interaction of a person's field D/I score and social intelli-
gence. This decision was based upon the speculation that persons who 
are both field independent and high in social intelligence may be rela-
tively superior in accuracy than those persons who do not possess both 
traits. To this end a new variable was formed, field D/I x social in-
~his issue is explicitly discussed in a later section. 
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telligence, by multiplying a subject's field D/I score with his/her so-
. 6 
cia! intelligence score (Ezchiel & Fox, 1959, Ch. 21) . This new vari-
able was found to significantly correlate with accuracy (~ = .274, one-
tailed £(.103). In addition, a ~t hoc decision was made to correlate 
the interaction of social intelligence and general intelligence with ac-
curacy. This follows the suggestion of Taft (1955, p. 20) that it may 
be a combination of these traits that are most related to accuracy in 
person perception. The positive correlation of this new variable with 
accuracy (r = .239, one-tailed E<·008) supports the post hoc hypothesis 
that persons who are high in both general intelligence and social intel-
ligence are superior in accuracy to those persons who are relatively low 
in both social intelligence and general intelligence. 
Taking these results into consideration the aforementioned regres-
sion analysis was performed using Accuracy Score as the criterion vari-
able and the following as possible predictor variables: (a) field 
dependence/independence; (b) social intelligence; (c) general intelli-
gence; (d) locus of control; (e) degree of personal moral code; (f) 
number of hours read per day; (g) number of hours T.V. watched per day; 
(h) number of Shakespearan plays read; (i) number of movies viewed per 
month; (j) total siblings; (k) field dependence/independence x social 
intelligence interaction; and (1) social intelligence x general intelli-
gence interaction. This set of predictor variables was chosen on a ~st 
hoc basis from the results of the correlation analyses i.e., those vari-
6 This multiplication was done after the raw scores on each vari-
able were standardized and a constant had been added to each standard 
score to eliminate negative values. 
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ables which were found to be at least marginally related to accuracy 
were included. 
The first variable to be chosen for inclusion was the field depend-
ence/independence x social intelligence interaction (X). This variable 
1 
formed Equation I 7 that significantly predicts Accuracy Score with a 
multiple-R of .274 and R2 of .075 (~(1, 98) = 7.97, .E.( .006). 
(I) Accuracy Score .274 X 
I 
On the second step, the variable, number of hours of T.V. watched 
per day, was chosen for inclusion. Combined with the first variable 
this second variable (X ) provided Equation II which significantly pre-
2 
diets Accuracy Score with a multiple R of .366 and an R2 of .134 (f 
(2, 97) = 7.49, .£_(.001) . 
(II) Accuracy Score . 274 X - .242 X 
1 2 
Equation II is a significantly hetter predictor than Equation I, i.e., 
an increase in R2 of approximately .06 (£(1, 97) = 6.56, E< .01). 
On the third step the variable, the number of siblings the person 
has, was chosen for inclusion. The addition of this variable (X ) to 
3 
the first two variables provided Equation III which significantly pre-
diets Accuracy Score with a multiple R of .421 and an R2 of .178 (~ 
(3, 96) = 6.91, .E.< .0005). 
(III) Accuracy Score .276 X - .246 X - .209 X 
I 2 3 
~egression coefficients are in standardized form. 
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Equation III is a significantly better predictor than Equation II, i.e., 
a significant increase in R2 of approximately .04 (!(1, 96) = 5.11, 
R_(.02). 
On the fourth step the variable, moral code, was chosen for inclu-
sion. Combined with the other three variables, this variable (X ) pro-
~+ 
vided Equation IV which significantly predicts Accuracy Score with a 
multiple R of .439 and an R2 of .192 (!(4, 95) = 5.66, .E_~.0006). 
(IV) Accuracy Score .264 X - .227 X - .195 X + .125 X 
1 2 3 If 
Equation IV is not a significantly better predictor than Equation III, 
i.e., a nonsignificant increase in R 2 of approximately . 015 (!(1, 95) 
1.76, n.s.). Therefore, Equation III appears to be the best and most 
parsimonious predictor of an Accuracy Score. Inspection of Equation III 
shows that persons who are both field independent and of high social in-
telligence, spend little time watching T.V., and have few siblings are 
high in Accuracy. On the other hand, persons who are field dependent and 
low in social intelligence, spend relatively more time watching T.V., 
and have many siblings are relatively lower in Accuracy. In addition it 
can be noted that the standardized regression coefficients in Equation 
III are similar in absolute size. This indicates that the three vari-
ables (field D/I x social intelligence interaction, number of hours of 
T.V. watched per day, and number of siblings a person has) assume rela-
tively equal importance in predicting Accuracy. 
Inspection of the correlation results in Table 5, shows that the 
degree of confidence a subject displayed in his/her rating is also sig-
nificantly correlated with Accuracy Score; in addition Confidence Score 
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appears to be relatively independent of the three subject variables in 
Equation III. As such, a post hoc decision was made to form a new pre-
dictor equation by adding the Confidence Score variable (X
5
) to the vari-
ables in Equation III. This new Equation (V) predicts Accuracy Score 
2 
with a multiple R of .466 and an R of .217 (!(4, 95) = 6.57, .E.< .0002). 
(V) Accuracy Score = .269 X
1 
- .251 X2 - .201 X3 + .198 X5 
This equation is a significantly better predictor than Equation III, i.e., 
an increase in R2 of approximately .04 (_K(l, 95) = 4.75, .E. (.03). 
A more complete perspective on Equation V's efficiency in pre-
dieting accuracy is presented in Figure 4. This figure. is a scatterplot 
of actual Accuracy Scores and predicted accuracy scores 8 • This figure, 
in addition to providing a visual display of the regression results 
(R = .466), allows for an inspection "how efficient" the equation (Va) 
is in predicting specific subjects' Accuracy. For the purposes of this 
analysis it was decided to refer to subjects with an Accuracy Score of 
'13 as a "significantly" accurate subject, i.e., a person who is 
approximately 2/3 correct in his/her judgment (see Appendix I for 
further discussion of the rationale underlying this decision). Figure 
4 has been divided into four regions for further understanding of Equa-
tion Va's efficiency. 
8A predicted accuracy score was computed for each subject using 
the following equation (regression constant are in nonstandardized 
form: 
A 
(Va) AS= .04267 X1 - .41253 X2 - .20534 X3 + .07034 x5 + 5.34865 
I 
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(a) Region! identifies an area of False Positives, i.e., a person 
is predicted as significantly accurate when in fact he/she is 
not. No points fall within this region (but one comes close). 
(b) Region _!! identifies an area of True Negatives, i.e., a person 
is predicted as having an Accuracy Score below the significant 
cut-off (AS = 13) and in fact this person's actual Accuracy 
Score is less than 13. Seventy-one percent of the points fall 
within this region. 
(c) Region C identifies an area of True Positives, i.e., a person 
is predicted as having an Accuracy Score equal to or above the 
significant cut-off and in fact the person's actual Accuracy 
Score is a significant one. Two percent of the points fall 
within this region. 
(d) Region D identifies an area of False Negatives or Type II Er-
rors, i.e., a person is predicted as having an Accuracy Score 
less than the significant cut-off, when in fact his/her actual 
Accuracy Score is a significant one. Twenty-seven percent of 
the points fall within this region. 
These results indicate that Equation V is a good predictor when it comes 
to avoiding False Positives (i.e., no one was falsely predicted as being 
significantly accurate), but not a good equation when it comes to False 
Negatives (i.e., 27 of the 29 subjects who were significantly accurate 
were predicted to be not significantly accurate). The implications of 
these findings are discussed later. 
Trust Scores. Due to the lack of support for the hypothesized re-
lationships, the exception being the low but significant correlation 
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betw~en · · the Trust Score and Trustworthiness of Others, it was 
deemed most appropriate not to pursue any multiple regression analyses. 
This decision was made given the consideration that while some signifi-
J 
cant post hoc results may·occur, the lack of findings at the bivariate 
correlational analysis step did not lend support for such further apos-
teriori analyses. 
Discriminate Analysis for Accuracy Scores 
In order to further explore the relationships between the subject 
variables and Accuracy, a stepwise discriminant analysis was performed. 
The specific purpose of this analysis was to determine what subset of 
predictor variables would most accurately classify subjects into one of 
two groups. Group One represents those subjects whose Accuracy Score is 
below the significant cut-off value of "13" and Group Two represents 
those subjects whose Accuracy Score was equal to or above "13". To this 
end, a new variable was generated with a value of "1" assigned to those 
subjects whose Accuracy Score was less than "13" and a value of "2" 
assigned to those subjects whose Accuracy Scores was greater than or e-
qual to 13. The discriminant analyses was then performed to find a dis-
criminant function which would optimally predict whether a subject was a 
member of Group One or Group Two. 
In this analysis the same subset of subject variables used in the 
stepwise multiple regression analysis was employed. A computer program, 
SPSS VI Discriminant, was programmed to perform the analyses in accord-
ance with the Wilke's criterion(~) for solution 9• In addition the 
9 Wilke's criterion (A) is the overall multivariate !. ratio for 
·the test of differences between group centroids (Klecka, 1975, p. 447). 
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computer was informed that of the total 100 subjects, 71 actually were 
in Group One and the other 29 were in Group Two. Table 6 displays the 
differences in group means for the variables in the predictor subset. 
As shown in this table, nine of the variables have significantly (p<.03) 
different groups means 10 • These significant differences indicate that 
compared with Group One persons, Group Two persons (the significantly 
accurate group) are more field independent, have more social intelligence, 
have a higher general intelligence, are more likely to have a personal 
moral code on which they base everyday decisions, watch less T.V. per 
day, have read more Shakespearan plays, watch more movies per month, are 
more field independent and socially intelligent, and are more socially 
intelligent and generally intelligent. Using this subset of variables 
the discriminant analysis program found a discriminant function which 
included three predictor variables. These variables (the number of mov-
ies watched per month, the number of Shakespearan plays read, and the 
interaction of social intelligence and general intelligence) combine to 
significantly discriminate between Group One and Group Two, (Wilkes' 
.A= . 88, ~ 2 (3) = 12.124, .E. (. 007); and have standardized discriminant 
function coefficients of -.559, -.384, and -.552 respectively. The ef-
ficiency of this discriminant function to accurately predict whether a 
subject is in Group One or Group Two is shown in Table 7. This table 
shows that 78% of the subjects were correctly classified into whether 
10In interpreting this finding, the disadvantages of multiple 
~-tests are important to remember. The probability that at least one 
of these 12 ~-tests will be spuriously found to be significant is: 
1- (1- .03Y 2 = .31 (Hays, 1963, p. 367). 
Table 6 71 
Group One and Group Two Means for 
Subject Variables in Discriminant Analysis 
Variable Gr. One X Gr. Two X t of Diff p( 
Field D/I 66.34 72.55 -2.57 .01 
Social Intelligence 22.97 24.59 -2.66 .009 
General Intelligence 15.27 16.31 -2.48 .01 
Locus-of-Control 11.01 10.79 n.s. 
Moral Code 6.92 7.52 -2.40 • 02 
Hours Read 2.51 2.69 n.s . 
Hours TV 1. 89 1.48 2.16 • 03 
II Plays 3.69 5.41 -3.09 .003 
II Movies 1. 35 1.86 ~3.33 . 002 
II Siblings 2.94 2.31 n.s. 
F D/I x SI Interaction -2.07 5.41 -3.49 .001 
SI x GI Interaction -1.94 5.61 -3.37 .001 
Table 7 72 
Efficiency of Discriminant Function 
Number of Predicted Predicted 
Actual Group Subjects Group One Group Two 
Group One 
Non-significant 11 69 (97. 2%) 2 (2.8%) 
Group Two 
Significant 29 20 (69%) 9 (31%) 
Note. Percentage of "grouped" subjects correctly classified: 78% 
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they were or were not significantly accurate in their ability to rate the 
tapes. Further inspection of Table 7 indicates that 69% of the subjects 
actually in Group Two were falsely classified into Group One (i.e., False 
Negatives), while 2.8% of:those subjects actually in Group One were 
falsely classified into Group Two (False-Positives). The efficiency of 
this discriminant function, although based on a different set o~ subject 
variables than the regression equation (V) is similar to the efficiency 
of Equation V in that it avoids False Positives, but not False Negatives 
(i.e., it identifies only two subjects as being significantly accurate 
when in fact they were no~, while it identifies 20 subjects as not being 
significantly accurate when in fact they were). 
DISCUSSION 
Judgmental Accuracy 
Consistent with past findings (Hocking, Note 1; Maier, 1966; Maier 
and Jansen, 1967; Maier and Thurber, 1969; and Maier and Lavrakas, 1976), 
and as hypothesized, listeners as a group displayed a better-than-chance 
ability to judge veracity in the audio medium. While this above-chance 
accuracy is significant, the percentage of correct judgments was only 
54.45%, which is considerably lower than the 77% correct Maier and Thurb-
er observed in their listeners group; in fact, of the 100 subjects in 
the present study, only four performed at a level comparable of the av-
erage listener of Maier and Thurber. Another study to report the aver-
age percentage of correct judgments by "listeners" is the investigation 
by Hocking (Reference Note 1). His audio-only group displayed averaged 
judgmental accuracy of 62% correct. 
II. I. The fact that the listeners in the present study were not as ac-
curate as listeners in these other studies may well be due to the pre-
sent operationalization of the veracity construct. Listeners in the 
present study had a relatively short exposure (approximately 10-15 
seconds) to each stimulus person's lie or truth. This not only limited 
the length of time the stimulus-person spoke, but also limited the quan-
tity of verbal information the stimulus person presented. On the other 
hand, listeners in other studies were exposed to stimulus persons for a 
longer time duration and presumably heard the stimulus-persons present ! i 
more verbal information. While this line of reasoning is speculative, 
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it follows from an assumption that in general the more spoken informa-
tion a listener has (up to some saturation level) the more able the 
listener will be to judge accurately. I do not regard this reasoning as 
inconsistent with the "information-overload" hypothesis advanced by 
Krauss et.al. (Reference Note 2) to account for judges' relative infer-
ior accuracy when judging audio and visual information. In that instance, 
the visual information is thought to "distract" the untrained observer; 
and, as Ekman and Freisen (1969) suggest, the face is well-equipped to 
lie successfully. 
Also consistent with past findings is the variation in judgmental 
accuracy shown by the present listeners. As was found in the pilot stud-
y, judgmental accuracy in the present study ranged from approximately 
20% to 75% correct, with a negatively skewed observed frequency distri-
bution of Accuracy Scores. This negative skewness indicates, as Figure 
3 displays, that the observed distribution of frequency scores deviates 
from normality in a "more accurate" direction. This suggests that while 
listeners do vary in their judgmental accuracy, a clear majority of 
judges (70%) displayed accuracy that was equal to or better- than- chance. 
This better-than-chance judgmental accuracy serves as the back-
drop for the present study's primary purpose i.e., an investigation of 
individual's differences as they relate to listeners' accuracy in human 
lie detection. After careful inspection of the data and interpretation 
of the results of the correlation, regression, and discriminant analyses 
it appears that a tentative profile can be advanced regarding 
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"who is a good lie detector" 11 : 
A good human lie detector appears to be a person who has a field 
independent mode of perception, is high in social and general intel-
ligence, has few siblings, shows an active interest in literature, 
films, and the manner in which he/she conducts his/her daily life, 
and makes his/her judgments with some degree of confidence. This 
description can be interpreted as follows: 
1. The listener's task in human lie detection can be conceptualized 
as an effort to perceive the "field" (i.e., the gestalt of the 
speaker) as a whole made up of separate, yet interdependent, 
parts (i.e., the various behavioral cues of the speaker), which 
can be evaluated as evidence for truthfulness or for falseness. 
As hypothesized field independent persons are better able to ac-
curately judge veracity. This may relate to their mode of per-
ception which apparently leads them to experience "the parts of 
the field .. as discrete from organized background, and [as such] 
deal with them separately" (Gary, 1967, p. 5190). 
2. It is especially interesting to note that the interaction of high 
social intelligence and high general intelligence is significant-
ly related to accuracy in human lie detection. This is in direct 
agreement with Taft's (1955, p. 20) conclusion that is in the 
combination of both forms of intelligence that enables a person 
to be a more "sensitive" evaluator of others. Human lie detec-
11 This profile is, of course, limited by the overall degree of 
validity of the present study, which will be explicitly discussed in 
the following section. 
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tion in this instance can be conceptualized as an "interpersonal 
problem solving task"; as such, being skilled in both social and 
general intelligence may increase the likelihood of a correct so-
lution to the listener's "truth or lie problem". 
3. Zajonc (1975) has recently advanced a theory for the relation-
ship between birth order, family size, and intelligence. He ar-
gues that intelligence is in part a function of the amount of 
experience a child has had interacting with adults. The present 
parallel to Zajonc's reasoning is the suggestion that the more a 
child interacts with an adult and observes adult-behavior, the 
more likely he/she will become acquainted with "adult modes of 
judging others" (Taft, 1955, p. 8). The finding that having few 
siblings is positively related to judgmental accuracy in human 
lie detection, can be interpreted following this child-adult hy-
pothesis. In general, children with fewer siblings are more 
likely to spend a larger proportion of their time interacting 
with adults than are children with relatively more siblings; 
therefore the child with few siblings may more likely be ex-
posed to adults qua perceivers in human lie detection, and 
thereby become more familiar with the adult-approach to "detect-
ing" the lies of others. 
4. Taft (1955) suggested that esthetic-literary interests and a-
bilities were very likely to be correlates of the ability to 
judge others accurately. While the scores on the improvised 
Artistic Interest Scale did not relate to accuracy in the present 
study other variables which may be part of the esthetic-literary 
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construct did show positive relationships to accuracy: (a) 
reading relatively more hours per day; (b) watching relatively 
less hours of television per day; (c) watching relatively more 
movies at a theater per month; and (d) having read relatively 
more Shakespearan plays. If these can be interpreted as indi-
eating esthetic-literary experiences then it may be such that a 
person's superior accuracy in judging veracity is related to 
his/her being a "broader" individual, i.e. , one who is more 
familiar with literary-esthetic interpretations of human emotion. 
As none of these variables show any strong correlation with so-
cial intelligence or general intelligence they appear to repre-
sent a dimension independent of "intelligence". 
5. It was found that a person who has a strong personal moral code 
by which he/she makes everyday decisions is more likely to show 
superior judgmental accuracy. It can be speculated that the 
person with a strong personal moral code will be more aware 
of the "morality" of others, than will a person without a strong 
personal moral code. If such a person is aware of the morality 
of others, he/she may well be "constantly" alert to the possibil-
ity that another person is lying and as such become more capable 
of detecting such behavior. 
6. Finally, the good lie detector has a relatively greater degree 
of confidence in the judgments he/she makes. While Haier and 
Jansen (1966) suggested that judges may not be able to articu-
late the reasons for their judgments, it does appear that the 
listeners in the present study had some degree of "self-know-
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ledge" regarding their judgment. This suggests that accurate 
judges "know" they are accurate while less accurate judges "re-
alize" they are uncertain. 
In general, this description of a "good human lie detector" corresponds, 
in part, with my~ priori hypotheses and also shows some correspondence 
with the description of a person who is, in general, a good judge of 
others (cf. Taft, 1955, 1956). This is not surprising as the listener 
qua perceiver in human lie detection is obviously engaging in a form of 
person perception, i.e., is the speaker to be perceived as a truth-tel-
ler or a liar? 
Of additional interest are the findings regarding the efficiency 
of the prediction equations. As earlier mentioned, both the multiple 
regression equation and discriminant function were efficient in that 
they did not predict False Positives. If subsequent research validates 
the present predictive relationships and their efficiency, this lack of 
predicting False Positives would be important for anyone who may want to 
identify "good human lie detectors" with a low probability of predicting 
incorrectly. 
Contrary to the set of a priori hypotheses, judgmental accuracy 
was not found to relate to extraversion, neuroticism, locus-of-control, 
or dogmaticism. It is also of interest to note that neither age nor 
sex were found to relate to judgmental accuracy. 
In accordance with another a priori hypothesis, listeners as a 
groupl showed a significant tendency to be more trusting, than distrust-
ing, in their ratings. It was suggested that such behavior could result 
from a combination of the ambiguity of the judgment task (i.e., listen-
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ers were led to believe that the tape stimuli could be any proportion of 
lies and/or truths) and from the fact that listeners had nothing to lose 
in making a mistake. This reasoning follows from an assumption that lis-
teners are acculturated to presume innocence, and to consider it less e-
quitable if an innocent person is mistakenly found guilty than if a 
guilty person is mistakenly found innocent. Based upon this interpreta-
tion of Accuracy and Trust results, I suggest that listeners in the pre-
sent study were able to judge veracity better-than-chance, but in making 
judgmental mistakes they were more likely to err in the direction of 
judging the statement as true. 
This interpretation of listener's judgments suggest that there may 
be two relatively independent components underlying a judgment in the 
present study, i.e., Accuracy and Trust (~(98) = .111, n.s.). Conceptu-
ally, this follows the aforementioned interpretation that listeners' 
judgments do not merely reflect Accuracy. This issue of judgments re-
flecting more than Accuracy appears reminiscent of Cronbach's (1955) in-
terpretation of traditional accuracy-measures in person perception 
which is discussed in the following section. 
Judgments in Human Lie Detection and Cronbach's Measurement Components 
Cronbach (1955) criticized traditional measures in person percep-
tion arguing that the "accuracy score" these measures produced was actu-
ally made up of four components (elevation, differential elevation, 
stereotype accuracy, and differential accuracy). In the person percep-
tion context, the component most closely approximating "true accuracy" 
is differential accuracy 
because the various response bias components (elevation, differential 
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elevation, and stereotype accuracy) have been eliminated .... The im-
mediate effect of Cronbach's article was to render invalid or unin-
terpretable most of the previous research in this area ...• In the 
period since 1955, fewer studies on accuracy in person perception 
have been reported. To be able to ask and answer the proper questions 
in this area requires extreme care in data collection and analysis 
of the data (Hastorf, Polefka, and Schneider, 1970, p. 32). 
While Cronbach's criticism seems to have put a damper on accuracy-in-per-
son-perception research, how does his criticism relate to the manner in 
which Accuracy was determined in the present study? 
The Accuracy Score computed here is based upon the number of cor-
rect dichotomous judgments the listener made in his/her rating of the 
stimulus set. I suggest that these dichotomous judgments represent a 
listener's first stage in the decision process (see Figure 5) i.e., is 
the speaker telling the truth or lying? The second stage in this deci-
sion process involves the listener's determination of his/her degree of 
"certainty". While I am not suggesting that a listener implicitly 
thinks through these two stages, I do assert that in general listeners 
make their ratings following this "unconscious" reasoning 12 • Had the 
Accuracy Scores been based on the specific responses on the 6-point 
scale, "true accuracy", confidence, and trust would have been totally 
confounded. The dichotomous manner in which the Accuracy Scores were 
computed eliminates the potential confound of confidence by collapsing 
across the confidence categories. In addition, it also eliminates the 
potential confound of "trust", with the possible exception of those in-
stances in which a listener was totally uncertain and therefore 
12 A possible exception to this decision model would be an instance 
in which a listener cannot decide lie or truth, therefore reasoning that 
he/she is uncertain first, with the lie or truth "guess" coming second. 
Listener-Perceiver 
is lying 
Speaker is not 
lying 
Figure 5. Two-stage judgment model for human lie detection. 
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"guessed" lie or truth. The results of the pilot study suggest that 
these instances of total uncertainty are not frequent; this was reflect-
ed by the virtual nonusage of the "totally uncertain" midpoint on the 
pilot study's seven-point'lie/truth rating scale. All this lends sup-
port to the validity of the Accuracy Scores used in this study as rela-
tively unconfounded measures of Accuracy. This is not meant to imply 
that they are totally reliable (an issue that will be later discussed), 
but that they are free from the confounds of confidence and trust. 
On the other hand, the Trust Scores in the present stud~ while 
having some construct validity are not totally "pure". This follows 
,I 
from the fact that the "true trust" component of the trust scores is 
confounded with accuracy and confidence. By this I mean that the actual 
ratings the listeners made on the 6-point scale are a mutual product of 
accuracy, confidence, and trust. Following the two-stage decision model 
proposed above, "true trust" will presumably affect a judgment when a 
listener is totally uncertain and therefore "guesses" lie or truth. 
This should be especially true when listeners face the judgment task 
with ambiguity as to the proportion of lies and truths in the stimulus 
set. Secondly, it is possible that trust affects the degree of confi-
dence a listener shows when he/she adheres to the two-stage decision 
model. By this I mean that a listener who is, in general, more trust-
ing-of-others may use the certain-response more than the suspect-response 
if he/she first decides "truth", or the suspect-response more than the 
certain-response if first deciding "lie". But at present, this remains 
mere speculation. 
If listeners had known that the proportion of lie and truth tapes 
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was 50-50, or if they had explicitly taken a 50-50 judgment strategy, a 
"true trust" score may have been computable as a component underlying the 
1 3 
overall ratings on the six-point scale • As the listeners, here, were 
not given a prior expectancy, and their behavior indicates they did not 
follow a 50-50 strategy, a "true trust" component is not available from 
the raw data. Despite this problem it is interesting to note that Trust-
ability of Others does correlate with the Trust Score in the present 
study lending some "construct" validity to the Trust Score, i.e., the 
"true trust" component of a listener's judgment is apparently contained 
within the Trust Score. 
In summary, the validity of Trust Scores is uncertain due to their 
confounding with Accuracy and Confidence. But of critical importance 
for the present study is the assertion that Accuracy Scores as computed 
here do reflect unconfounded Accuracy. 
Validity Issues 
Statistical Conclusion Validity. The data analyses in the present 
study were performed in both an~ priori and ~posteriori manner. Spe-
cifically (with the exception of the one sample t-tests and bivariate 
correlational analyses) the step-wise multiple regression and step-wise 
13If a 50-50 strategy had explicitly been used subjects' devia-
tion from a Trust Score of 70 would be a "purer" indication of true be-
havioral trust, but not a perfect one. For a relatively unconfounded 
measure of true behavioral trust, as reflected in judgments, an investi-
gator would need to know on which judgments listeners were tot~lly un-
certain. Then by observing which "side" of the lie/truth rating scale 
the totally uncertain subject used, the investigator could form a "true 
trust score" which should be more reflective of the subject's general 
level of behavioral trust of others. As these possible instances of 
total uncertainty are indeterminable, in the present study, such an "un-
confounded" measure of true trust is not available. 
discriminant analysis are done after-the-fact. That is, I determined 
the subset of variables to be entered as predictors for these multi-
variate techniques on the basis of the bivariate correlation results. 
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In addition, these techniques themselves are "post hoc" in a sense that 
they produce optimal results, i.e., "they take what you give them, and 
give you back the best that's there". With this in mind, it is possible 
that some Type I Errors are present, given the multitude of individual 
tests performed. But due to the variety of statistical tests performed 
I cannot estimate what the experiment-wise error rate (Kirk, 1968, p. 
83) of the entire study is. Despite this limitation, strong support of 
the suggestion that the multivariate results are not spurious comes from 
the very low levels of probability associated with them (the regression 
equation had a significance level of less than .0004 and the discriminant 
function had a significance level of less than .006). Given this, and 
the size of the sample (large enough to minimize Type II Errors), I am 
led to the conclusion that the results presented here have good statisti-
cal conclusion validity. None-the-less, replication is needed before 
this question will receive a more definitive answer. 
Internal Validity. As the present study was not designed to test 
cause-and-effect relationships, concern for internal validity becomes 
one of "what validity do the interpretations of the observed relation-
ships have?" In proposing a "tentative profile" of the good human lie 
detector, possible cause-and-effect interpretations have been advanced 
that could, in my opinion, account for the covariation between field 
independence, social intelligence, etc. and judgmental accuracy. As 
these possible causal relationships were not tested by the present study 
they are no more than plausible explanations for the observed covaria-
tion. The "validity" of these plausible explanations must then be 
judged against the reasonableness of the logic they are based upon. 
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While the explanations th~t are advanced for the observed relationships 
between field independence, social intelligence, and general intelli-
gence are based on what I consider to be sound conceptual reasoning, the 
explanations for the observed relationships between accuracy and the li-. 
terary-esthetic experience, number of siblings, and confidence are specu-
lative. Despite this self-assessment, the answer to the question of the 
internal validity of the "causal-interpretations" must await experiment-
al research. 
Construct Validity. In order to put the results of the present 
study in a proper perspective one must consider the construct validity 
of the criteria and predictor variables. The predictor constructs, for 
the most part, were measured by tests with recognized reliability and 
validity. A criticism could be advanced that use of abbreviated inven-
tories for measuring field dependence/independence and general intelli-
gence lessens confidence in the validity of these scores. This criticism 
may be correct from a reliability standpoint, i.e., shortening the tests 
may have reduced their reliability and hence validity. If this is the 
case, then the trust of this criticism should be directed in the Type 
II Error direction, i.e., a more reliable measure may have found a 
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a stronger relationship between Accuracy and these variables 14 • In ad-
dition to these possible criticisms, an obvious criticism is the lack of 
reliability information regarding the Artistic Interest scale. This is 
enough of a problem to render totally uninterpretable the finding of no 
relationship between Accuracy and artistic interests. Finally, the 
questions on the demographic and background questionnaire have no proven 
reliability. While this should not be a concern for the descriptive 
items, e.g., age, sex, number of siblings, etc., there is uncertain re-
liability for the personal habits and personal attitudes questions. A-
gain, following the reasoning advanced earlier, if these questions pro-
duced unreliable measures of the predictor constructs they were intended 
to tap, then it is possible that some Type II Errors have been made, 
i.e., it is possible that some predictor constructs and accuracy are re-
lated, but the tests of these relationships may not have been sufficient-
ly sensitive. 
While discussion was earlier presented regarding whether Accuracy 
Scores reflect "true accuracy", the reliability of these Accuracy Scores 
was not discussed. As listeners in the present study did not return to 
make a second set of judgments on an equivalent stimulus set, there is 
no information regarding reliability over time. This lack of "test-re-
14This follows from the correction for attenuation (Guildford, 
1943, p. 400): 
ryx = ryx 
. t 
rxx 
where r represents the true correlation of x and y, rxy, 
yxt 
represents the observed correlation between x and y, and rxx represents 
the reliability of x. 
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test" reliability information is also the case for the other studies of 
perceiver accuracy in human lie detection, which were reviewed in the 
introduction section of this dissertation. In addition, none of these 
studies have reported the-internal consistency of their accuracy scores, 
i.e., what is the interrelationship among the judgments made on the dif-
ferent stimulus persons? 
Hunt and Lin (1967) had found that accurate judges were accurate 
across different personality-types, which suggests that a "good" judge 
is good in a general sense. Despite this general ability that Hunt and 
Lin's good judges showed, it is quite possible that different good 
judges were accurate on different subsets of judgments. As Hunt and Lin 
and the human lie detection studies reviewed earlier did not report any 
of these results, this question is unanswerable as it applies to these 
investigations. 
In the present study this issue becomes one of asking whether in-
dividual judges "earned" their Accuracy Scores by being accurate on 
exactly the same subset of stimulus persons. If this had been the case, 
one would expect some tapes to be rated correctly nearly 100% of the 
time and others to be rated correctly nearly 0%. The observed range of 
percentage of judgments correct for the stimulus tapes was 32%-77%. 
This range, while not as extreme as 0%-100%, does not rule out the pos-
sibility that judges were consistently good or bad on the same tapes. 
To answer this question more precisely a between-persons homogeneity 
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coefficient 15 was calculated. This value for the present 2,000 judgments 
is .181; which means that 18% of the variation in Accuracy Scores, as 
measured ll the stimulus set in the present study, is accounted for by 
actual individual differences in accuracy. How should this value be in-
terpreted? 
In interpreting this coefficient it is important to remember that 
the set of stimulus tapes represents 20 different speakers each in one 
of 20 different speaker conditions. It therefore follows that these 20 
stimulus persons represent 20 different lies or truths. While these dif-
ferent stimuli are in one sense qualitatively s1milar, it is evident by 
the "low" value (.181) that the tapes are judged with differential ac-
curacy, e.g., listeners with an Accuracy Score of 11 apparently made 
their 11 correct judgments on different subsets of 11 tapes. This "low" 
homogeneity coefficient indicates a good deal of heterogeneity among 
listeners on which tapes they were accurate. This suggests that the 
Accuracy Score in this study is made up of as many as 20 "different kinds 
of accuracy 16". Thus, an Accuracy Score can be interpreted as reflect-
15 The following homogeneity coefficient indicates the amount of 
variance in accuracy that is directly accounted for by consistent in-
dividual differences in accuracy among the 20 judgments (Guildford, 
1954, p. 384): 
between-persons homogeneity = MSbp - MSres. 
MSbp 
16 In fact, a factor analysis of the intercorrelation of the 20 
"accuracy11 scores indentified nine factors accounting for 64.5% of the 
variance. Yet a Varimax rotation produced loadings that were not 
meaningfully interpretable regarding the conditions that were used to 
generate the 20 tapes. 
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ing general accuracy across the set of tapes i.e., the higher a listen-
er's Accuracy Score the more accurate he/she was in judging a variety of 
lie and truth conditions. 
The construct validity of the Trust Scores in the present study 
has been earlier discussed. At that time, it was stated that a listen-
er's degree of behavioral trust in others (as measured by Trust Score) 
is confounded with accuracy and confidence. As such, Trust Scores are a 
low validity measure of behavioral trust as they apparently contain other 
sources of variation other than trust and error. 
' 
External Validity. The generalizability of the tentative descrip-
tion of a good human lie detector must necessarily be limited by the 
situational specifics of the judgmental task employed. By this, it is 
meant that the judgmental accuracy measured here is the ability to listen 
to the speech of someone who is "voluntarily" advocating an honest or 
dishonest position in order to "help" someone else (the experimenter), 
and then accurately judge whether the speaker is telling the truth or 
lying. In addition, listeners had "nothing to lose" by making a mistake 
in ·judgment. This raises the question of motivation level of the listen-
ers. Would similar predictor-criterion relationships have been ob-
served if there had been some source of extrinsic motivation, e.g., a 
reward for the listener with the highest accuracy? In the present 
study, listeners' motivation to "do the best they could" may have been 
totally intrinsic; listeners who wanted to help the experimenter by per-
forming well may have been the most motivated to concentrate on the 
judgment task. If differential motivation is a factor in the accuracy 
of listeners it may as well confound the observed predictor-criterion 
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relationships. While this could be a potentially serious limitation of 
the findings, it should be remembered that all listeners were informed 
of the importance of this research due to the implications it might have 
' in future legislative decisions. If listeners regarded these introduc-
tory instructions with the sincerity and importance with which they 
were spoken, it may be justified to assume that the listeners were ex-
trinsically motivated to do their best. Unfortunately this issue must 
remain unresolved. 
In addition to the motivation ~evel and s~~cific conditions under 
which listeners heard the lies and truths, a proper limitation to the 
generalizability of these findings is the population of humans that the 
listeners represent. H'hile the observed predictor-criterion relation-
ship might hold for all humans, the present findings must be limited to 
a population of relatively well educated, primarily Caucasian, urban-
middle class, young adult males and females. This limitation of gener-
alizability is necessary until this research is replicated on different 
age and social-economic-status level individuals. 
Finally, the question of the generalizability of the "lies and 
truths" themselves must be discussed. In the present study a speaker 
was voluntarily asked to help another person (the experimenter) by 
providing an honest or dishonest testimony. From the speaker's per-
spective the testimony would, at most, cause another person to either 
waste a few minutes participating in a dull task or miss participating 
for a few minutes in an interesting task. I suggested these lies and 
truths have mundane realism due to the assumption that many humans en-
gage in such "persuasion" on a regular daily basis. On the other hand, 
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the stimulus persons in the present study, did not confront the listen-
ers for whom their testimony was allegedly intended. It may be assumed 
that Ekman and Friesen (1969) might not regard these "lies" to be total-
ly valid deceptive communications according to their criterion dimensions 
of deceptive interactions: (a) there is an uncertain saliency to the 
deception; (b) the stakes for the speaker to be successful are somewhat 
low; (c) there is no listener to confront the speaker, and therefore no 
balance of roles; and (d) there is no struggle between deceiver and po-
tentially deceived about the mainteQance of the 'eception. While the 
speakers' "lies" in the present study are deceptive communications in a 
broad sense, they do not closely conform to Ekman and Freisen's criteria. 
Whether this is a valid limitation to the generalizability of these 
findings is at present uncertain. 
A final issue regards the ethics of the methodology used to gener-
ate the stimulus lies and truths. Conforming with the four criterion 
dimensions, Ekman and Friesen (1974) and Hocking (Reference Note 1) 
generated a set of stimulus tapes on the assumption that it was corr~_<;_t:_ 
and ethical to inform their subject-speakers that to be a success in 
their chosen field, they themselves might have to become masters of the 
deceptive communication. In generating these stimulus tapes I did not 
want to "deceive" subject-speakers to such an extent. In my mind, I 
went as far in deception as I personally felt comfortable; I say this 
not as a criticism of the ethics of Ekman, Fr~esen, and Hocking, but 
merely to point out the apparent difference between myself and these 
18 
,,t hllr researchers . 
93 
t•l,~_sible Future Directions for Research in Perceiver-Differences in Hu-
man Lie Detection 
·---
The present explora,tory study is not intended to provide a defini-
tlve statement regarding "who is a good lie detector" i.e., what person-
~logical dimensions validly predict human accuracy in human lie detec-
tion. Instead, this study was conceived as a necessary first step in 
the systematic investigation of perceiver differences. As has been re-
viewed, most past research has focused on stimulus properties and/or 
stimulus-perceiver interactions. As there appeared to have been a 
dearth of findings regarding perceiver differences the present study was 
a fruitful one for further hypotheses generation. Yet only through fol-
low-up research can the tentative profile of a "good human lie detector" 
be validated. 
The present findings also provide a possible comment on the dyna-
mics of human lie detection. The listener's task in the present study 
was to listen to an unseen stranger and make a decision of "lie" or 
"t.ruth". In the real world the majority of our verbal exchanges prob-
~hly is done in the presence of another with whom we are acquainted and 
,.,hom we also can "see". (An exception to this availability of v~ual 
Information would be telephone conversations.) If the listeners in the 
present study did make judgments in accordance with the two-stage deci-
nlon-model presented earlier, the judgments were free from the "bias" 
18Personally, 
v.aged in, I justify 
11peakers received. 
t:hat nurses and law 
"successful". 
while I am uncomfortable about the deception I en-
it by knowledge of the debriefing the subject-
In addition, I do not agree with the assumption 
enforcement officers need to be deceptive to be 
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from prior-knowledge of the speaker and of visual information; listeners 
in the present study did not approach each judgment with some predispo-
sition towards the speaker. In the real world of the face-to-face verbal 
exchanges humans undoubtedly do have some such predispositions. The re-
sults regarding Differential Trust suggest that listeners were more sus-
picious of the stimulus persons with more "deviant" voices. If such a 
bias does exist outside the laboratory (and I have little common sense 
reason to doubt its existence) then it attenuates the decision-making 
model in Figure 5, by serving as a source of unaccounted for variance. 
Thus, while a listener might first make the lie or truth decision, any 
bias that he/she brings into the interaction probably affects the prob-
ability of a specific lie or truth decision; and undoubtedly affects the 
confidence with which the decision is ultimately made. Therefore. un-
til more "real" world investigations of human lie detection are per-
formed the validity of the present perceiver decision-model remains un-
certain. 
Possible Applied Implications of !~search in Perceiver Differences in 
Human Lie Detection. 
I could provide many specific instances in which government and 
industry, not to mention private citizens, might possibly apply these 
findings if after extensive further research they "proved" valid. But 
I prefer to limit my speculations to a conservative comment and a pos-
sibly controversial one. 
As previously mentioned, a recent U.S. Congressional Committee has 
recommended legislation for the total elimination of U.S. governmental 
use of mechanized lie detectors. If such a course of legislative action 
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is enacted, governmental decisions regarding veracity would stand in 
the province of human decision makers, as is presently the case in 
trial by judge or jury. Relevant to this, the finding of this disserta-
tion can be interpreted as lending some validity to the jury qua group 
approach to accuracy in human lie detection. If individuals' (qua 
individuals) ability to accurately judge veracity is heterogeneous a-
cross different speakers, then a group of judges should be more likely 
to have some members who are accurate in judging veracity. While this 
does not ensure that the accurate judges will convince their fellow 
group members of the accuracy of their perception, it does suggest that 
at least the possibility does exist. On the other hand, if the judges 
had shown homogeneity across different speakers, it would imply that 
even groups of judges would be unlikely to have accurate individual 
group members in perceiving certain types of lies or truths. Obviously 
the findings presented here do not provide an answer to this issue; 
they are merely suggestive for further research. 
The more radical speculation that I advanced parallels R. Heinlein's 
concept of a "Fair Witness" in Stranger in a Strange Land. Heinlein 
(1961) wrote: 
Jubal looked pained. 'You know how Fair Witnesses behave.' 
'Well, no, ••• I don't, I've never met one,,. [said Jill]. 
'So? Anne!' 
Anne was on the springboard; she turned her head, Jubal called out, 
'That house on the hilltop-can you see what color they've painted 
it?' 
Anne looked, then answered, 'it's white on this side.' 
Jubal went on to J~ll, 'You see? It doesn't occur to Anne to infer 
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that the other side is white, too. All the kings horses couldn't 
force her to commit herself ... unless she went there and looked---and 
even then she wouldn't assume that it stayed white after she left.' 
'Anne is a Fair Witness?' 
'Graduate, unlimited liscense, admitted to testify before the High 
Court. •• ' (p. 64). 
In the America of Heinlein's story, individuals have been liscensed be-
cause of their ability (probability through training) to visually per-
ceive a situation and describe what they have perceived free from the 
bias of inference. Here then is a society that "professionalizes" its 
witnesses and thereby places greater credulance on their perception than 
on the perception of the average "untrained" witness. Might we reach 
a time in the future in which "professional" human lie detectors serve 
as jurors instead of "average" citizens? If we do, for good or for bad, 
it may in part result from the findings of intensive research regarding 
the validation of who and what makes a good human lie detector. 
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Rating Sheets for "Screening" of Lie/Truth Stimuli 
Please rate this task on each of the following scales: 
1. very dull 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11 very interesting 
2. very easy 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11 very difficult 
3. very unpleasant 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11 very pleasant 
4. not very demanding 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11 very demanding 
Please rate how you felt about making the tape recording: 
1. very uncomfortable 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11 very comfortable 
2. very honest 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11 very dishonest 
3. very ethical 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11 very unethical 
4. very tempted to 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11 not very tempted 
refuse to refuse 
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Cover Story for Subjects Making Honest/Dishonest Testimonies 
"Encouraging" Cover Story' 
We would like to have high school students participate in the task 
you have just completed. Unfortunately, we cannot offer credit to them 
to encourage their participation. Would you please help us by making a 
tape recording that would encourage them to participate. 
I found this experiment very interesting anc challenging. All in 
all, it seemed well worth my time to participate and I would expect 
you to enjoy it too. 
"Discouraging'Cover Story 
We would like to have high school students participate in the task 
you have just completed. Unfortunately, more have signed up than we 
need. Would you please help us by making a tape recording that would 
discourage them from participating. 
I found this experiment very dull and unchallenging. All in all. it 
seemed like a waste of time to participate and I would expect you 
to dislike it too. 
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Instructions for Improvised Tape Judgments 
I'm. going to play some tape recordings for you of people either ly-
ing or telling the truth. l know which tapes are truths and which are 
lies, and I am interested if you can accurately determine which persons 
are being honest and which dishonest. I will play one tape recording at 
a time, and after each tape you are to judge the honesty or dishonesty of 
the speaker. 
So that you can better understand the content of the tape record-
ings, let me explain how these tapes were made. A person came and either 
participated in either an interesting or dull experiment. After finish-
ing the experiment the person was asked to make a tape recording saying 
that the experiment was interesting and challenging and that they would 
reconnnend it to others, or that it was basically dull, unchallenging and 
that they would not recommend it to others. Those persons who partici-
pated in the interesting experiment and then said it was interesting ar~ 
telling the truth, while those who participated in the interesting experi-
ment and said that it was dull are lying. In the same way those persons 
who participated in the dull experiment and say that it was dull are 
--
telling the truth while those who participated in the dull experiment 
and said it was interesting are lying. 
Your task is to tell which persons are lying and which are telling 
the truth. I have made many tape recordings of persons lying and telling 
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the truth. You will rate only a few of the tapes I have made. Please 
rate each tape without thinking of your ratings on the other tapes. The 
set of tapes you will be listening to have been randomly chosen so that 
it is possible that all are lies or all are truths or any combinations 
of lies or truths. Remember, think only of the tape itself when you make 
your rating. Thank you. 
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Instructions for Read-Tape Judgments 
I'm going to play some tape recordings to you of persons either 
telling the truth or lying. It will be your task to try and determine 
whether the speaker in the tape is being honest or dishonest. These 
tapes were made in a manner similar to the other tapes you have heard; 
that is, a person participated in either a dull or interesting experi-
ment and then made either an honest or dishonest tape recording about 
the experiment. An important difference in this set of tape recordings 
is that all of these persons were reading~ script. For some persons 
the script was an honest one, while for others it was a dishonest one. 
The set of recordings that you will be listening to have been randomly 
chosen from a larger set of tapes: therefore these tapes could be all 
honest, all dishonest, or any combination of honesty or dishonesty. 
Remember to rate each tape independently without thinking of the other 
tapes. Also please remember that in this set of tapes speakers 
are reading a script; therefore the words they speak will be identical. 
Thank you. 
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Artistic Interests Scale 
Please indicate whether you would Like (L), be Indifferent to (I), or 
Dislike (D) working in the following occupations: 
L I D Actor L I D Interior decorator 
L I D Advertising executive L I D Minister 
L I D Architect L I D Musician 
L I D Artist L, I D Musi teacher 
L I D Banker L I D Photographer 
L I D Carpenter L I D Police officer 
L I D CPA L I D Sales personnel 
L I D Electrician L I D Sculptor 
L I D Engineer L I D Veterinarian 
L I D Farmer 
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Demographic and Background Questionnaire 
1. Sex: Female Male ' 
2. Age: 
3. Racial-ethnic group: black latino oriental white other 
4. # of younger brothers you have # of older brothers you have 
# of younger sisters you have # of older sisters you have 
5. How religious do you consider yourself? 
very religious 1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9 not at all religious 
6. Religious affiliation: Catholic Jewish Protestant Other None 
7. Do you have a personal moral code that helps you make decisions in 
your everyday life? 
Not at all 1--2--3--4--5--6--7--8--9 Very much so 
8. Marital Status: single married other 
9. Average amount of reading you do daily: hours 
10. Average amount of television you watch daily: hours 
11. Average # of movies you see at a theater: ___ monthly 
12. II of plays of William Shakespeare you have read: 
13. II of years of schooling you have completed: __ years 
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ANOVA for Accuracy Scores 
An analysis of variance was performed to investigate the existence 
of any pattern in the accuracy of the ratings of the 16 non-accented 
tape recordings. This analysis was a 2 (read vs. impromptu) by 2 (lie 
vs. truth) by 2 (dull vs. interesting) by 2 (male speaker vs. female 
speaker) repeated measures ANOVA. The purpose of this analysis was to 
investigate the presence of any main effects on these four factors. The 
result of this ANOVA was used to make a decision whether or not to form 
a single Accuracy Score based on all of the ratings of the tape stimuli. 
These main effects are shown as follows: 
Source 
read vs. impromptu 
lie vs. truth 
dull vs. interesting 
male vs. female 
ss 
6.313 
76.903 
20.099 
4.488 
df MS 
1 6.313 
1 76.903 
1 20.099 
1 4.488 
F 
3.255 
27.359 
9.469 
2.489 
n.s. 
.001 
.01 
n.s. 
These main effects represent tests between the following means: 
read (3.599) vs. impromptu (3.723) 
lie (3.445) vs. truth (3.877) 
dull (3.550) vs. interesting (3.772) 
male (3.609) vs. female (3.714) 
Inspection of these results shows that subjects were significantly 
more confident-accurate in their ratings of truth tapes than lie tapes 
and interesting tapes than dull tapes. The significant difference be-
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tween the lie tapes and truth tapes could well be due to subject's ap-
parent tendency to make judgments in a "trusting" direction, i.e., of 
all the ratings that were made for these 16 tapes 56.62% were on the 
"honest" side of the scale. Therefore, since subjects were generally 
more likely to believe a specific tape, they were also more likely to 
be accurate on the honest tapes than they were in their ratings of the 
dishonest tapes. This confound, then, probably explains the significant 
main effect associated with lie tapes versus truth tapes. On the other 
hand, there is no ready explanation for the significant difference in 
accuracy between the dull and interesting tapes. Despite these "signi-
ficant" results a decision was made to compute an Accuracy Score based 
on the ratings of all 20 tapes. This decision was made, in part, for 
the sake of parsimony and in part because these "significant" differences 
in accuracy were not large in absolute value. 
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Reliability of the Accent/Nonaccent Distinction 
In order to support~the assumption that the four tapes made by the 
persons with "accents" were in fact distinguishable from the other 16 
"non-accented" tapes, an independent group of 30 students in a Loyola 
undergraduate class were asked to listen to the 20 tapes and identify 
the "type" of voice each speaker had. This task required these subjects 
to indicate whether they regarded the voice as "Midwestern White" or a 
"non-Midwestern White". The three "accent" tapes that had been made by 
Blacks were identified as being "non-Midwestern White" by 100% of the 
judges. The fourth tape which had been made by a male with a strong 
"New York Jewish" accent was identified as being "non-Midwestern White" 
by 67% of the judges. Each of the 16 non-accented tape.s were judged to 
be "Midwestern White" by a majority of the raters. These results sup-
port the assumption that the four "accented" tapes are reliably dis-
tinguishable from the 16 "non-accented" tapes. 
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Criteria for Cut-off Point 
In the pilot study it had been observed that approximately 30% of 
the most accurate listeners' accuracy scores fell into a region that on-
the-basis-of chance would have expected to contain only the 10% most ac-
curate. This pattern was again observed in the present data i.e., while 
only 13% of the Accuracy Scores would be expected by chance to equal or 
exceed "13", 29% of the actual Accur<!-CY Scores fr·l_l into this region. 
Following from this it was decided to refer to this group who were ap-
proximately 2/3's correct or better as "significantly" accurate. 
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